

THE
COMING CRISIS
OF
WESTERN
SOCIOLOGY

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*What Happened in Sociology:
An Historical Model of
Structural Development*

I have so far attempted to outline a few characteristics of the utilitarian culture with which middle-class society began; I now want to explore some ways in which these intertwined with the development of sociology itself. In doing so, I also hope to secure leverage for a broader analysis of the *structure* of Western sociology and the dynamics of its development. Thus I shall be concerned here not so much with the substantive content of specific theories as with the historical development of sociology's shared infrastructures, its intellectual and social organization, its differentiation and sponsorship by different nations and social classes, the division of intellectual labor in which sociology has taken a part, and the historical periods or stages in which these structures crystallized or changed.

Much of what I say below shall be in the nature of flat assertions concerning these structures and their development, rather than a probing analysis or an historical documentation. In other words, it is a preliminary effort at constructing a model about what happened to Western sociology. In effect, it is a theory of the development, and an outline for the history, of modern Western sociology.

There have been four major periods in the international development of Western sociology, which are here largely defined in terms of the theoretical syntheses dominant in each:

Period I, *Sociological Positivism*, which began about the first quarter of the nineteenth century in France and to which the key contributors were Henri Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte;

Period II, *Marxism*, which crystallized about the middle of the

nineteenth century and expressed an effort to transcend the powerful tradition of German idealism and syncretize it with such traditions as French socialism and English economics;

Period III, *Classical Sociology*, which developed about the turn of the century prior to World War I, and may be conceived as a period of consolidation and accommodation. It strived to accommodate the central developments of the first and second periods by bridging Positivism and Marxism, or to find a third path. It also sought to consolidate earlier developments, often only programmatic in nature, and to embody them in detailed, scholarly researches. It was a "classical" period because most of those scholars now regarded by academic sociologists as "classical" did their work at that time: for example, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Vilfredo Pareto;

Period IV, *Parsonian Structural-Functionalism*, which crystallized during the 1930's in the United States in the evolving theory of Talcott Parsons and was given complex development by the "seed group" of young scholars who early had studied with him at Harvard: for example, Robert K. Merton, Kingsley Davis, Wilbert Moore, Robin Williams, and others.

PERIOD I: SOCIOLOGICAL POSITIVISM

The beginnings of Sociological Positivism were characterized by an ambivalence toward traditional middle-class utilitarianism, being both critical of *and* continuous with it. Following the French Revolution, Henri Saint-Simon—one of the "fathers" of both modern socialism and sociology—formulated his famous parable of sudden death. In this, Saint-Simon invidiously contrasts the useless court with the productive *industriel*. What would happen, he asks, if France one day lost all of its scientists, industrialists, and artisans, and on that same day also lost all the officers of the Crown, its ministers of state, judges, and largest landholders? Of the latter group, Saint-Simon replies, the loss would only be sentimental, grieving the good-hearted French but causing no political evil to the state, for these useless men could easily be replaced. From the loss of the former, however, France would be stricken and would topple from its place as a leading nation. Central to Saint-Simon's judgment on men and society was a powerful distinction between the useless and the useful.

Like Sièyes, Saint-Simon addressed himself to the question, use-

ful for whom? Utility, he said, must be for the nation and, indeed, for humanity as a whole. In his "Letter from an Inhabitant of Geneva" of 1803, Saint-Simon reminds the poor that

you voluntarily concede a degree of domination to men who perform services which you consider useful to you. The mistake which you make, in common with the whole of humanity, is in not distinguishing clearly enough between the immediate and more lasting benefits, between those of local and more general interests, between those which benefit a part of humanity at the expense of the rest, and those which promote the happiness of the whole of humanity. In sort, you have not yet realized that there is but one common interest to the whole of humanity, the process of the sciences.¹

Among other things, one may notice here the utilitarian and scientific framework within which conceptions of collective welfare, essentially continuous with those later embodied in the Welfare State, are beginning to emerge. That Saint-Simon's anticipation of the Welfare State, and his linking of it to science and sociology, was neither cryptic nor casual may be seen in his remarks of 1825, where he holds that the elite minority need no longer maintain itself by force in an industrial society, and that the problem of integrating the community is now subordinate "to improving the moral and physical welfare of the nation." Public policy, says Saint-Simon, should aim at giving the working class "the strongest interest in maintaining public order . . . [and] the highest political importance," by state expenditures "ensuring work for all fit men," by spreading scientific knowledge among the working class, and by ensuring that the competent—namely, the industrialists—administer the nation's wealth: the public welfare sector is thus to operate within the framework of the private sector.² Perhaps the main difference between Saint-Simon's policies and those of the modern Welfare State is that he often places the welfare function in *nongovernmental* hands.

Saint-Simon was also clearly concerned with another question, namely, *what* is useful? Here, as noted above, he especially stressed the utility of science, knowledge, and technology. The central novelty in Saint-Simon's position, then, was not his concern with utility or even his insistence upon social as opposed to individual utility, but was rather his conception of *what* fosters utility, of the things that are useful. It was precisely his emphasis on the utility of science and technology, combined with his relativistic notion of the useful—which allowed that arrangements once useful could cease to be such—that led Saint-Simon's disciples to a critique of private property.

Holding that under modern conditions private property was not

conducive to the production of social utility, because private inheritance of property might result in management by incompetents, the Saint-Simonians came to socialism. Far from opposing utility, their "utopian socialism" led to a refined conception of utility as a social standard, and they launched a critique of those institutions that were held to impede utility.

The positivists and utopians, in short, sought to extend and socialize individualistic utilitarianism. While stressing the importance of the economic, they sought to broaden the range of things regarded as economically useful to include, and indeed to center on, the vital significance of technology and science. Perhaps also reflecting the somewhat distinctive tendency of many French intellectuals, then as now, to combine an interest in science with one in politics and art, Saint-Simon seems to have been determined to rescue art from being warped by a narrowly economic valuation; he found a legitimate (because useful) place for artists in the new industrial society by proposing that they become engineers of the soul and an inspiration to collective morale. In so doing, he conceived art as an activity to be judged by its *social* utility. Saint-Simon thus looked beyond the individual person or family to a concern with what was useful for the larger society's coherence or solidarity.

SOCIOLOGY AS A COUNTERBALANCE TO INDIVIDUALISTIC UTILITARIANISM

From its beginnings in nineteenth-century Positivism, sociology was a counterbalance to the requirements of an individualistic utilitarian culture. It emphasized the importance of "social" needs neglected by, and required to resolve the tensions generated by, a society that focused on individual utility. It was a theory to cover what had been left out. The residual had to be added; as some sociologists once said, sociology is an $N+1$ science. In other words, it was a theory of the *complementary* structures needed to make whole the new utilitarian society. While critical of the deficiencies of the new culture, the aim of Positivist Sociology was thus not to overthrow it but rather to *complete* it. What was seen to be wrong with society was the defective structure of the totality.

In its Positivist beginnings, the new social science entailed a "cultural lag" theory. This explained current social tensions as a symptom of the system as a whole, due either to the continued existence of once functional but now archaic institutions, or to the immaturity of the new industrial system that had emerged, but as yet had failed to create appropriate new institutions in other sectors. In short, the new society's flaws were seen as those of an

undeveloped adolescence rather than as the decrepitude of old age. Saint-Simon, Comte, and, later, Durkheim contributed to a sociological tradition that stressed the importance of developing shared belief systems, common interests and wants, and stable social groupings. It was expected that they would have a moral authority strong enough to restrict the striving of competitive individualists and provide them with anxiety-reducing group memberships. Technical activities would be controlled by guild-like professional associations that assumed a communal character, and personal life would be regulated by institutionalized arrangements governed by common values. These were to restore what had been "left out," and thus make society whole.

This response intended to counterbalance the operating code of the new utilitarian economy, which, being concerned with the efficient use and production of utilities for private gain, stressed unrestricted individual competition, stripped men of group involvements that limited their mobility, and transformed them into deployable "resources"—to be used when useful and discarded when not—thus making them adaptable to an ever-changing technology. It was in part because the central emphasis of the sociology of the early nineteenth century focused on what the new utilitarian culture had neglected and on the social problems generated by its assumptions, that it then failed to win stable support from the emerging middle class.

In fine, the newly emerging sociology did not reject the utilitarian premises of the new middle-class culture, but rather sought to broaden and extend them. It became concerned with *collective* utility in contrast to individual utility, with the needs of *society* for stability and progress, and with what was useful for this. In particular, it stressed the importance of other, "social" utilities, as opposed to an exclusive focus on the production of economic utilities. Sociology was born, then, as the counterbalance to the political economy of the middle class in the first quarter of the nineteenth century.

THE EXTRUSION OF THE ECONOMIC FROM THE SOCIAL

This historical development has had abiding consequences for the place of sociology in the scholarly and academic division of labor. For the sociological focus was and remains centered on a *residual* element in middle-class, utilitarian culture. Sociology made the residual "social" element its sphere.

As it first emerged in Sociological Positivism, and, in particular, in the work of Saint-Simon, it is clear that sociology's historical mission was to *complete* and culminate what it viewed as the still

unfinished business of the emerging industrial revolution. Saint-Simon thus expressly conceived of sociology as being needed in order to extend the scientific outlook from the physical sciences to the study of man, and thus approach man and society in a manner consistent with the emerging scientific revolution. For Saint-Simon, sociology was required to finish what the other disciplines and physical sciences had still left undone. It was to be a culminating *addition* to the new industrial outlook. It was, in this sense, to be an $N+1$ science.

This $N+1$ conception always has had two somewhat different implications. On the one hand, it involved focusing on intellectual leftovers, on what was *not* studied by other disciplines. On the other hand, it sometimes led sociologists to conceive of their discipline as the "queen" of the social sciences, concerning itself with all that the others do, and more; possessing a distinctive concern with the *totality* of sectors, with their incorporation into a new and higher level of integration, and with the unique laws of this higher whole. This ambitious claim, however, was suitable to sociology only when it was still outside the university before it had to compromise with the claims of other academic disciplines, which regarded such a conception of the sociological mission as, at best, pretentious and, at worst, intellectually imperialistic.

As sociology adapted to the claims of other, more academically entrenched disciplines, it sometimes found the more humble interpretation of itself less provocative. In this *interpretation* of itself, and in its attendant scholarly practice and researches, sociology often came to dwell on those concrete institutional areas and social problems that were not already academically preempted: on the family, ethnic groups, the urban community, on suicide, criminality, divorce. In its scholarly *practice* sociology often became the study of what was left over by other disciplines; it became a residual discipline. But this solution was neither intellectually nor professionally satisfying. On the *theoretical* level, sociology came in time to conceive of and legitimate its place as an *analytic* discipline. It conceived itself as characterized by its distinctive perspectives and concerns, not in terms of the concrete subjects it studied. This meant that, *in principle*, sociology could study *any* aspect of human life, any institution, sector, group, or form of behavior, just as economics could, the difference being the questions and interests it had in them. For some sociologists of a later period, such as Leopold von Wiëse or Georg Simmel, this was taken to mean that sociology's domain was in the formal aspects of social relations and processes; for example, in cooperation, succession, competition, integration, conflict, or in dyads, triads, or rates of interaction. The most fundamental of such formal concerns that moved to and re-

mained the center of the attention of academic sociologists—as it had been for Western social theorists since Plato—is the problem of social order: the nature and sources of social integration, coherence, and solidarity.

Sociology thus remains concerned with society as a “whole,” as some kind of totality, but it now regards itself as responsible only for one *dimension* of this totality. Society has been parceled out analytically, among the various social sciences. From this analytic standpoint, sociology is, indeed, concerned with social systems or society as a “whole,” but only insofar as it is a *social* whole.

In theory sociology is now no different from, and certainly no worse than, any other social science, each being characterized by a distinctive analytic interest, its special way of angling into the whole. In practice, however, the specific researches of sociology still frequently focus on concretely different “topics,” or on those concrete institutions or problems not traditionally encompassed by other social disciplines. Sociology remains a residual science in its practice, even if autonomous in its self-image as an analytic science focused on the general problem of the integration of groups or societies. There exists in actuality no *general* social science, but only a set of unintegrated and specialized social sciences. (In the academic social sciences there is nothing that corresponds to Medicine.)

This means that Academic Sociology traditionally assumes that social order may be analyzed and understood without making the concerns of economics focal and problematic. It implies that the problem of social order may be solved, practically and intellectually, without clarifying and focusing on the problem of scarcity, with which economics is so centrally concerned. Although aspects of sociological analysis make *tacit* assumptions about scarcity, sociology is an intellectual discipline that takes economics and economic assumptions as givens, and that wishes or expects to solve the problem of social order under any set of economic assumptions or conditions. Sociology focuses upon the noneconomic sources of social order. Academic Sociology polemically denies that economic change is a sufficient or necessary condition for maintaining or increasing social order.

POSITIVIST GRAND THEORY AND THE RESTORATION STALEMATE

In the period of the Positivist synthesis, sociology arose to form a Grand Theory of society, with a distinctive and strong emphasis upon the importance of studying society scientifically: with the same “detached” manner as other sciences study their subject mat-

ter, said Comte, neither praising nor blaming it. Positivism emerged in France in the sprawling work of Henri Saint-Simon, following the Revolution of 1789. It was systematized by Comte as a Grand Theory during the Restoration, a time when, following the defeat of Napoleon, the combined military might of the European aristocracy was restoring the French nobility to its control of France.

In brief summary, Restoration social structure, as a matrix for the crystallization of Sociological Positivism, involved the following major factors: (1) a fundamental conflict between the restored nobility and the middle class, involving basic characteristics of the forthcoming society and the essential terms of settlement of the Revolution; (2) despite their mutual opposition, each of the major contending classes was somewhat ambivalent and uncertain of the terms that it would settle for, and the nature of the social map that it would support; that is, there were splits both within the nobility, between moderates and ultras, and within the middle class; (3) nevertheless, a great variety of basic issues were under contention; the fundamental question of which group would control the larger society was critical, because each was supporting a radically different mapping of the total social order; (4) one of the oldest sources of authoritative mapping under the old regime, traditional religion, continued to lose much of its public support and credence, particularly as it gave renewed support to the restored nobility and the Crown; (5) at the same time, science continued to develop and to win public prestige.

It was out of these essential developments that there emerged a set of collective public sentiments which was, on the one hand, detached from *both* major contending social alternatives—old regime traditionalism and middle-class liberalism—and, on the other, expressed a need for a new social map to which men could attach themselves; that is, for a *positive* set of beliefs. It was this new structure of collective sentiment that Sociological Positivism congenially resonated and which, in part, enabled it to find public support.

The program of an important section of the restored elite was not merely a limited political one; divided more in tactics than ultimate purpose, many among the old elite were bent upon transforming the entire social world, and refracting it as far as they could toward their traditional map of the ancient regime. They did not seek piecemeal political reforms, but aimed at a fundamental transformation of the larger social structure. What was at stake in Restoration society, therefore, was not some specific political institution, not some piece of legislation or executive enactment, but rather, the total network of institutions and the total culture that had surfaced during and after the French Revolution.

Important segments among the Royalists believed that their newly restored political power depended for its stability on certain economic and ideological conditions; they believed that their political position could not be fundamentally stabilized without larger changes in the total social structure. Thus, for instance, under Villèle, between 1822 and 1827, laws were passed for the indemnification of the nobility and the preservation of primogeniture, both aiming to restore the nobility's socio-economic position. They also enacted a law of sacrilege, attempted to abolish the Université de France, and proposed various laws bearing on the censorship of the press.

Those among the middle class who wished to defend their newly emerging institutions needed to respond on the same broad institutional level, with more than a political program that might guide them from election to election; they were under pressure to develop a coherent ideology about the social order as a totality. But their own ambivalence toward the Revolution, their fears of renaissance Jacobinism and of the urban masses, blurred their vision of what they wanted and blunted their political initiative. Moreover, during the Restoration they were in no mood to share their own newly acknowledged and severely restricted political privileges with unpropertied groups. The people of the middle class thus had few unequivocal conceptions about the nature of the social order they wanted, except that it be constitutional in character, limited in governmental powers, and *laissez faire* in policy. They had, one might say, an image of the shell of a social order, but no firm view of its content; their map of a desirable social order was largely "negative," focusing as it did on the maintenance of individual freedom *from* political control.

This was a period when newly emerging social structures and institutions, far from being taken for granted, were highly precarious; moreover, this precariousness was a visible one, for the contending views were subject to articulate public debate. The most fundamental structures of society were at issue, and the debates concerning them in the legislature were amplified in cafes, in shops, and in homes. In the end, to some extent, each of the powerful contenders nullified the other and undermined the full commitment that might have been given to one or the other's conception of society.

Having once again clearly aligned itself with the nobility, the traditional Church's moral authority was further undermined among the middle class. Thus one of the main forces, which might have presented itself as a nonpartisan alternative and thus resolved the dilemma, had been deeply compromised. Many among both the aristocracy and the middle class became increasingly

sensitized to the political uses of religion, and a more instrumental and detached view of religion developed. As George Brandes remarks: "In the seventeenth century man believed in Christianity, in the eighteenth century they renounced and extirpated it," and in the nineteenth century, they looked at it "pathetically, gazing at it from the outside, as one looks at an object in a museum."³

Out of this growing detachment there developed, perhaps most acutely among the young, a crisis of belief and a sensed need for new *positive* beliefs. As Madame de Staël remarked: "I do not know exactly what we must believe, but I believe that we must believe! The eighteenth century did nothing but deny. The human spirit lives by its beliefs. Acquire faith through Christianity, or through German philosophy, or merely through enthusiasm, but believe in something."⁴ Here, as in other matters, de Staël was a sensitive weathervane, articulating some of the surfacing collective sentiments that Sociological Positivism, then emerging, would express. Positivism would stress the importance of positive beliefs, counterposing them to the negativism of the Enlightenment, as well as advocating a new "religion of humanity."

The period, then, was characterized by a sensed detachment from traditional beliefs and by an expressed need for new ones. Moreover, by 1824, there was a rising new generation, which, by that time, constituted a majority of the European population. They were deeply attached neither to the ideologies of the Revolution nor to those of the counterrevolution, for these had little rooting in their own personal experience. Lacking the loyalties or the bitterness of those who had played a role in the Revolution as adults, the new generation was not moved by the old slogans. They feared neither revolution nor reaction quite as personally as had their parents.

At the same time, the new generation was being exposed to educational institutions increasingly favorable toward the rapid development of science. For example, science was being pursued and taught at the Collège de France, Faculté des Sciences, the Muséum d'Histoire Naturelle, and Ecole Polytechnique. New scientific journals were being established, and science and philosophy were being separated both in France and Germany. There was a growing interaction between science and industry; engineering was emerging as a systematic application of science to industry. The belief was taking hold that there was a single scientific method applicable to all fields of study. The growing prestige of science began, in part, to substitute for the attenuation of traditional religion, and science came to attract those who felt a need for a new and general belief system.

The early nineteenth century had been an emotionally exhaust-

ing quarter-century of revolution and war, and this was compounded by the failure, during the Restoration stalemate, authoritatively to resolve the most basic issues concerning the social order. The Revolution had deeply undermined the older religious faith, and the political partisanship of the Church under the Restoration had done little to restore confidence in its moral authority. At the same time, however, the Revolution itself was coming to be seen by many in the middle class from its negative, irrational side, as a time of anxiety and bloodshed. Many thus experienced detachment from both of the dominant alternatives. To many, also, the emerging world of peaceful bourgeois routine was bloodless and uninspiring. There was need of a faith that could endow life with a new meaning, and restore a sense of commitment and involvement. The new generation, then, had a capacity for detachment, on the one side, and a readiness for a stimulating new belief system on the other. Both these sentiments were essentially akin to the standpoint of the Sociological Positivism then developing: the new structure of collective sentiments was congenially resonated by and expressed in the new sociology that extolled scholarly detachment even as it offered a new religion. The new theory was borne by a new infrastructure.

Neither the old regime, with its traditional beliefs, nor the anti-traditional Enlightenment rationalism was sufficient to anchor personal convictions. Both were out of keeping with the personal reality that many now experienced. Now, after twenty-five years of dramatic upheavals, of adrenalizing adventure, of history-making involvements, the return of peace was, for some, depressing: life seemed drab and meaningless.

What these individuals sought was a belief system that would endow the present with drama and color, would invest it with deep transcendental meaning that would not pale when compared with earlier enthusiasms and solidarities, and which would enable it to take on a drama of its own. In short, what was needed was an ideology that, on the one side, *romanticized* the present, and on the other, was compatible with the new world-view of science. What was needed was a view that was both romantic *and* scientific. What also was needed was an alternative to the traditional map of the social world, which had been destroyed by the Revolution and, because of the middle class's disillusionment about revolutionary terror and its abiding fear of Jacobinism, not been replaced. With the Thermidorean reaction, the middle class had begun to hedge on its own vision of the world and the future, and had no clear position. It was in this social context that Sociological Positivism developed.

The breakdown of the old regime's old social mappings had

these three aspects: (1) the attenuation of the traditional *image* of the social order, the specific kinds of social identities it had established, the objects it had valued, and their relationships with one another; (2) the failure of the traditional *sources* of authoritative map-making, most especially with the weakening of the Church's social influence; (3) the problem of map-making *methods*. One massive, multifaceted response to the breakdown of the old social mappings was a surge of new, comprehensive map-making efforts on different levels and in different quarters of society. For example, on the state level there was constitution-making, a comprehensive legal effort to order, specify, and give fixity to a social order in minutely legislated detail. From another direction there was "utopian socialism," the socialism of Fourier, Cabet, and the Saint-Simonians, which presented its image of a counter-social order in plans of equally minute detail. Utopian comprehensiveness, we might say, was the emerging Left's map-making counterpart to constitutionalism, while constitutionalism was the map-making utopianism of the liberal middle class. In addition there was Sociological Positivism itself, whose comprehensive map-making took two distinct forms: systematic or Grand Social Theory, as in Comte's work, and the "religion of humanity," with its minutely specified catechisms and holidays and its detailed ritual and symbolism.

Sociological Positivism was related to the breakdown of traditional social mappings in one unique way. This was expressed in its sense of the irrelevance of all the dominant social mappings then available, and in its consequent search for a new *method* of social mapping. Hostile to lawyers and "metaphysicians," it sought for new *elites* that could authoritatively establish the new social maps. For Positivism, the new map-making authorities were to be scientists, technologists, and *industriels*. Its new *way* of making maps for the social world was to be science.

Much the same map-making problem was then being confronted by the German Romantics, but they did not define map-making as a cognitive, rational, or scientific effort; they viewed it as a feat of imagination and spirit. Thus the new map-making elite that the Romantics favored was not scientists but poets and, more generally, artists. But whether scientists or artists, Western Europe was seeking a new elite to fill the vacuum and provide an authoritative source of new social mappings. It would be utterly wrong, therefore, to think of French Positivism and of Romanticism (German or French) as two entirely separate or mutually isolated responses to the map-making crisis of the time. To see this, one need only remember de Staël's enthusiasm for the German Romantics and the French response to her study of them in her book on Germany.⁵

For that matter, we might also recall Saint-Simon's grand offer to marry de Staël, Saint-Simonianism's search for *la femme libre* and its attraction to "free love;" or, again, the religion of humanity itself. French Positivism was a *blend* of science and Romanticism, a "scientism," but nevertheless it was a blend in which the scientific element was focal and dominant.

French Sociological Positivism resonated an emerging structure of collective sentiments, in which the world was seen to need new mappings because the moral commitment to the traditional social maps had been weakened while the prestige of science was growing. Positivism was a response to the moral uncertainty and moral exhaustion of the Restoration. It sought to escape from the Restoration stalemate between the nobility and the middle class. Against the clash of right against right, Positivism affirmed the propriety of an *amoral* response to the social world; it stressed the value of knowledge about society and universalized this moral escape by transforming its amoral method for making social maps into a moral rule.

On one of its sides, then, Positivism called for a new, practical, useful, and amoral social science as a tool for making social maps. It would not merely "moralize" about what society should be; it would find out what it was and would be, and, on this basis, would found its new morality. In this methodological posture, Positivism constituted a delaying tactic, implicitly calling for a moratorium on all the map-making that was then going on, a delay that would in effect be indefinite or would presumably extend until Positivism could, through its new methodology, create a new social map. Positivism was conforming to a structure of exhausted sentiments that said, in effect, a plague on both your houses: upon bourgeois and Restorationist, upon feudal traditionalist and middle-class liberal, upon Royalist and Jacobin.

Yet, the Positivists were also infused with utilitarian sentiments that brought them close to a middle-class outlook and led them to expect and to seek middle-class support. This was, in the end, withheld; so, while the Positivists were drawn to the middle class, they were not pulled fully into its orbit, for they resented the middle class's failure to appreciate and support them. Underlying and exacerbating Positivism's detachment, was its disappointment with and resentment of the propertied middle class. To the degree that the middle class withheld active support from them, the Positivists had little choice but to be "above the struggle." Not wishing and not forced to choose among alternatives, what Positivism made sacred, therefore, was not the map itself, but the rules for making it, a methodology. In this distinctive way, Positivism was a social movement that uniquely stressed the possibility of living in the world

without a map, with the use only of a method and the sheer information it produced.

This, at any rate, was one distinctive emphasis of Positivism; but there was another, directly contrary, which led it to produce a detailed and "positive" map of the social world. This was Positivism's religion of humanity, for which both Comte and Saint-Simon had designed highly specific blueprints. This utopian aspect of Positivism was the future-oriented counterpart to the backward-looking historical novel of the Romantics; in both, social worlds were being designed and mapped in imaginative detail, and offered as alternatives to the present.

From the beginning, Positivism entailed this deepgoing conflict: the "Positive" meant, on the one side, that men should base their map-making upon the *certainties* of science, and, on the other, that they should be not only critical, but also for some specific conception of how the world should be. In its first, methodological posture, Positivism counseled patience and warned of premature commitments to social reconstruction. In its second, religion-of-humanity stance, Positivism eschewed "negativism" and forthwith produced a new map of the world. To meet the problem in Restoration society of the loss of the traditional faith, Positivism offered a new religion of humanity.

The study of society, and especially the call for a detached scientific method of studying society, was born of an effort to find an apolitical alternative to political conflicts over the fundamental character of society. As such, Positivism was congenial to those among whom science had prestige, especially educated sectors of the middle class, and who sought a prudent way of producing social change—progress within order, skirting political conflict so as not to risk the mobilization of uncontrollable allies, the radical Jacobin potential, and simultaneously to minimize the reactionary, Restorationist backlash.

The dissonance between these two sides of Positivism began to be reduced by the factional differentiation that emerged among the various disciples of the fountainhead of Positivism, Saint-Simon. Following Saint-Simon's death, two distinguishable groupings soon formed. One of these, centering around *Enfantin* and *Bazard*, ultimately syncretized with Hegelianism in Germany—in the work of Marx's teacher, *Eduard Gans*, among others—and contributed to the development of Marxism. Another faction, centering around *Comte*, ultimately eventuated in Academic Sociology.

One of the ways in which these two factions differed was in respect to their conception of science itself. *Enfantin* and *Bazard* had a rather Romantic appreciation of the actively creative role of hypothesis, intuition, and "genius" in the process of knowing. In

brief, they saw science as a "lamp" rather than a "mirror," embodying active forces akin to those that the German Romantics regarded as the source of poetry and art. This positivistic grouping also had a more politically *activistic* component than Comtianism.

When the Comtian faction failed utterly in its efforts to win acceptance for its new map, its religion of humanity, it gave up this effort and became increasingly concerned with the methodology of map-making rather than with the map to be made. Academic Sociology, in its Positivistic heritage, thus emerges from the failure of Comtianism as a practical social movement for cultural reconstruction. Viewed historically, in relation to the Positivist's own aspirations, modern "value free" sociology is the anomic adaptation of Sociological Positivism to political failure, an adaptation that commonly takes a ritualistic form, in which pure knowledge or the methodology of map-making tends to become an end in itself. Continually striving to be "above the conflict," it serves as a refuge for those seeking an apolitical alternative to the dominant images of society that are in conflict. The specifically Positivistic aspect of modern sociology has a political taproot: the failure of middle-class politics to yield a coherent image of the new social order.

DETACHMENT AND OBJECTIVITY

Utilitarian culture, in its confluence with the Restoration crisis, had fostered acute sentiments of detachment. Positivism transformed this detachment into an ideology and morality. Detachment was the characterological foundation of the morality of objectivity, while Positivist objectivity envalued the sentiment of detachment. Objectivity, as a value, prescribed and articulated a detachment that the detached self already felt: ought implied can. The Positivistic demand for objectivity resonated the sense of detachment fostered by a utilitarian culture, in which a sense of the intrinsic value of objects was being undermined by the shifting appraisal of consequences fostered by market conditions. In a market economy, intrinsic object attachments impede buying and selling; here, whether men keep or sell any object depends ultimately on the price offered for it. If they will sell themselves, their time and their services, for a price, there are few things they will balk at selling when the price is right. In such a culture, there is, therefore, less of a strain in the demand that men be "objective."

A concern with the usefulness and marketability of things cripples our ability to love them, and hence to feel loving. There is a negative dialectic between use and love, each one impeding the other. No one sensed this with a surer instinct than the Romantics,

who counterposed passionate and personal love to detached and impersonal use; who held, as Goethe had, *Gefühl ist alles*; or who claimed, in Werner Sombart's pointed antithesis: "Either economic interests, in the broadest sense, or love interests, form the central point of all of life's importance. One lives either to work or else to love. Work implies saving, love implies spending."⁸ "Objectivity" is the compensation men offer themselves when their capacity to love has been crippled. Thus those who wish to speak in praise of objectivity often know no better way of doing so than to denounce "sentimentality."

On this level, such objectivity is not neutrality, but alienation from self and society; it is an alienation from a society experienced as a hurtful and unlovable thing. Objectivity is the way one comes to terms and makes peace with a world one does not like but will not oppose; it arises when one is detached from the status quo but reluctant to be identified with its critics, detached from the dominant map of social reality as well as from meaningful alternative maps. "Objectivity" transforms the nowhere of exile into a positive and valued social location; it transforms the weakness of the internal "refuge" into the superiority of principled aloofness. Objectivity is the ideology of those who are alienated and politically homeless.

In suggesting that objectivity is the ideology of those who reject both the conventional and the alternative mappings of the social order, I do not, however, mean to suggest that they are equally distant from both; commonly, these "objective" men, even if politically homeless, are middle class and operate within the boundaries of the social status quo. In some part they tolerate it because they fear conflict and want peace and security, and know they would be allowed considerably less of both if they did not tolerate it.

Let me put the matter in another way: sociology emerged in the Restoration conflict, when, as de Staël said, men had lost their traditional beliefs and felt a need to believe in something. It emerged as an objective and detached study of society because traditional values had broken down and there were no firmly delineated alternatives. The soil on which sociology grew was manured by a pervasive anomie. The objectivity of Sociological Positivism arose when men entertained the suspicion that the world in which they lived was passion-spent and had little in it worth living or dying for.

Fundamental to the alienation they experienced was the split in the universe: the cleavage between power and morality. The old patterns of legitimacy were losing or had lost potency, while the emerging locus of power, the new bourgeoisie, had only the thinnest and most dubious legitimacy. One of the most paradoxical

characteristics of modern culture is its abiding contempt for the middle class: the very term "bourgeois" has always had an ineradicable edge of derision to it. Sociology and the Positivist demand for objectivity emerged when traditional and middle-class values were, in the first case, unworkable, and, in the second, unheroic or uninspiring.

The Positivist sociologists tried to mend this split between power and morality in various ways. For one, they held that morality could grow out of knowledge of social reality. For a second, they attempted to shore up morality through the religion of humanity. Most important of all, however, and out of an abiding conviction about the corrupting consequences of power, they proposed to separate the "temporal" and "spiritual" orders and constitute them as insulated realms. They did this, in large measure, because they wanted to protect their spiritual order and certain values in it. They wanted to preserve their objectivity and their "dignity"; they did not want to be put to meanly practical uses. While the Positivists proposed to educate and refine the moral sensibility of the new men of power, they intended to do so only from a protected distance. They really did not like these men, if for no other reason than that they were neglected and unappreciated by them. Yet they were ready to use them if they could, and, correspondingly, they were ready to be used—"consulted," in a manner befitting their dignity—and they waited patiently to be discovered. In short, they proposed what was, in effect, a deal: they were to be treated with respect and left in charge of their own spiritual order, and in return they would respect the temporal order as it was, although still attempting to uplift it: they would render unto Caesar. That was the political meaning of Positivism's objectivity.

Even today the value-free, high science sociology that is the heir of Positivism, serves to defocalize the ideological dimensions of decision-making, diverting attention from differences in ultimate values and from the more remote consequences of the social policies to which its research is harnessed. It is congenial, therefore, to an "engineering" or managerial position, in which the client specifies the ends to be pursued while the sociologist provides the means or appraises only their efficacy. Classical Positivism manifested a clear drift in this direction from its inception. Such a conception of the sociological task does not require, and is indeed dissonant with, the more comprehensive, more assertively ideological social mappings of Grand Theory; it seeks, instead, specific knowledge about limited social sectors and requires intensive research for acquiring it. The contradiction between Positivism's scientific ambitions and its map-making impulses remained relatively in-

visible during its classical period, in part because there was then little support provided by the middle class for intensive social research.

As such funding becomes increasingly available, the emphasis on rigorous methodologies assumes a very special rhetorical function. It serves to provide a framework for resolving limited differences among the managers of organizations and institutions, who have little conflict about basic values or social mappings, by lending the sanction of science to limited policy choices concerning ways and means. At the same time, its cognitive emphasis serves to defocalize the conflict of values that remains involved in political differences, and to focus contention on questions of fact, implying that the value conflict may be resolved apart from politics and without political conflict. Positivism thus continues to serve as a way of avoiding conflicts about mapping. Yet, despite this seemingly neutral, nonpartisan character, Positivism's social impact is not random or neutral in regard to competing social mappings; because of its emphasis on the problem of social order, because of the social origins, education, and character of its own personnel, and because of the dependencies generated by its own funding requirements, it persistently tends to lend support to the *status quo*.

POSITIVISM: BETWEEN RESTORATION AND REVOLUTION

The middle-class society that had, as in France, broken through the old regime, clearly understood that the danger to its further development lay, in important part, in the continued resistance of old institutions and elites. The practical political task confronting the middle class entailed the protection of its newly won positions, against the restoration of the old regime, which it identified with social forces of the historical past. In sort, old elites were still seen as consequential in the present; their continuing power was condemned as illegitimate on the grounds of their present social uselessness, as in Saint-Simon's parable.

The early Sociological Positivists, like many among the emerging middle class, sensed that the past was still alive and dangerous, and they expressed this feeling in a "cultural lag" theory. They conceived of the present as embodying certain tensionful contradictions, which they viewed not as within and inherent to the new bourgeois institutions, but rather as conflicts that existed between them and older, "archaic" institutions lingering on from the past. These contradictions were expected to resolve themselves in the course of social evolution. In this, the archaic past would wither

away, and the new society would be *completed* by the rounding-out of its institutional requirements and by developing new institutions appropriate to those middle-class arrangements that had already emerged.

At the same time that the middle class sought to strengthen its new position in society against the older elites, it also found itself confronted with a newly emerging proletariat, the urban masses, who seized upon middle-class revolutionary militancy to advance their own interests. The middle class was thus constrained to inhibit its own revolutionary initiatives, for fear that it would be unable to control the emerging masses. There was, in short, the Thermidorean reaction.

The nineteenth-century middle class was soon in the position of having to pursue its interests by waging a social struggle on two fronts. Change had to be tempered with a prudent concern for social order, political continuity, and stability. The middle class' need to complete its revolution, on the one hand, and its simultaneous need to protect its position and property from urban disorder and proletarian unrest, on the other, help to account for August Comte's twofold slogan, "Order and Progress," and his conception of progress as the unfolding of order. Comte's evolutionary, prophetic sociology held that what was required for completion of the new society was not revolution but, rather, the peaceful application of science and knowledge: Positivism. Comte's sociology reflected the middle class' impulse to fortify its new social position against restoration from above, while avoiding the risks of revolution from below. The new sociology resonated the sentiments of a middle class precariously caught between past and future, between still powerful old elites and emerging new masses.

As suggested earlier, the middle class failed at first to support the new sociology, even though it coincided with their needs and perspectives in some respects. They backed away from it partially because it was critical of their narrowly economic and individualistic version of utilitarianism. Moreover, in focusing attention on sociological structure, sociology tended to diminish the importance attributed to the state. At a time when the middle class was still involved in a struggle for control of the governmental apparatus, Comte had hardly anything to say about the state.

The Positivistic Sociology of the early nineteenth century was not the intellectual creation of the propertied middle class. Its ground-work, rather, was initially laid by the dispossessed aristocracy, including the Counts DeBonald, DeMaistre, and Saint-Simon; their ideas were fused with a concern with "science" attractive to the civic, and especially the engineering, professions then emerging. *Sociology was thus at first the intellectual product of old strata*

that had lost their social power and of new ones that were still far from fully developed. The intellectual concerns and cultural traditions of these strata were not identical with the needs of bourgeois property; the noble antecedents as well as the superior education of the men who created the new sociology gave them a sense of their superiority, which troubled the new, often vulgar, men of money. In large measure, the new sociology of Saint-Simon and Comte was the product of a marginal social strata, of those dying or still not fully born. It also won the support of stigmatized groups, like the Jews, and from persons with various individual stigmata, such as pronounced mental illness, marriage to prostitutes, bankruptcy, or bastardy.

These men were commonly viewed with profound discomfort by the propertied middle class. They were disreputables, who had publicly declared themselves for "free love." They were men of dangerous character, who were bundled off to jail and prosecuted. The *arriviste*, the still socially and politically insecure middle class of the early nineteenth century, was not about to ally itself with such men or their sociology. Moreover, the rising middle class did not relish being told, by advocates of the new sociology, that it was science and technology, rather than property, that legitimated authority in the modern world. The middle class had not fought the aristocracy and disestablished the powerful Church, only to be yoked by a seedy little sect. Comte would wait in vain.

It was only as industrialism deepened its hold on society that sociology would come into its own. Only where and when the institutional requirements of commercial industrialism were fully established; only when the middle class was secure from the restoration of old elites; only when it therefore did not look upon the past as a threat and did not believe the future required anything radically different: only then could the middle class relinquish a cultural lag theory that explained away present social tensions as due to old institutions grown archaic. These were among the *necessary* conditions for the acceptance and *institutionalization* of sociology in middle-class society.

Sociology could then relinquish its historical and evolutionary perspectives, curtail its future-orientedness, and live upon the knife-edge of an isolated present. By the classical period, evolutionism began to give way to "comparative" studies and to Functionalism. Functional sociology, with its ahistorical character and its emphasis upon the *ongoing* consequences of existent social arrangements, reflects the loss of historical imagination that corresponds to the mature entrenchment of the middle class, which no longer fears the past and neither imagines nor desires a future radically different from the present. Thus, modern, functional social theory

and sociology itself are, at first, largely the product of those societies where middle-class industrialization moved ahead most rapidly: that is, France, England, and, above all, the United States.

PERIOD II: MARXISM

Born of and in capitalism, no less than in a struggle against it, popular, politically powerful, Marxism also placed a central value on social utility, even though it polemicized against Benthamite utilitarianism. From an historical perspective, one function of popular Marxism was to *complete* the utilitarian revolution by overcoming the obstacle that bourgeois property presented to the further extension of standards of utility. It is this which, in part, contains the historically "progressive content" of Marxism. Popular Marxism was not, of course, alone among socialisms to commit itself to a form of popular utilitarianism, as may be gleaned from H. G. Wells' biting criticism of Beatrice Webb, she of the "bony soul."

On the level of publicly affirmed and genuinely believed values, there is no difference in principle between capitalism and socialism with respect to the slogan: from each according to his ability, to each according to his work. The "honest bourgeois" would agree: men should work hard and to the best of their ability; and they should in turn be paid in full what their work is worth.

THE SOCIAL UTILITARIANISM OF MARXISM

Socialist and bourgeois would disagree, however, with respect to the exclusive use of utility as a standard for determining what men receive. Commonly, socialists felt that men's needs, as well as their usefulness, were a legitimate basis for allocating goods and services to them. While insisting that men's wants were corrupted under capitalism, Marx believed that men had certain universal "species needs" as humans, and that, as socialism matured, they would develop more truly human needs. Marx and other socialists believed that men's claims to gratification were ultimately rooted in these needs, and not simply in their usefulness.

On the one hand, Marx, like the Utopian Socialists, acknowledged utility as a standard, and, indeed, sought to overcome im-

pediments to its historical development; he sought to socialize utility. On the other hand, he also sought to balance and temper utility with considerations of human need, even during periods of early industrial development, in the anticipation that utility would be transcended when economic development had vastly increased productivity; and then human needs, no longer corrupted by venal motives, could become more truly human.

Let me be at great pains to insist that Marx's position about utilitarianism was very complex and that it is mistaken to interpret him as an exponent of traditional utilitarianism. Nothing can make this complexity clearer than the polemic Marx mounted against Jeremy Bentham, that "insipid, pedantic, leather-tongued oracle of the commonplace bourgeois intelligence of the nineteenth century."⁷ Yet to understand Marx's polemical position on utilitarianism, its strengths and its limitations, it is vital to see his assumptions.

First, Marx insisted that we cannot talk about utility in general, but only about utility for something:

To know what is useful for a dog, we must study dog nature [and] . . . he who would pass judgment upon all human activities, movements, relations, etc., in accordance with the principle of utility, must first become acquainted with human nature in general, and then with human nature as modified in each specific historical epoch.⁸

Thus Marx insisted that we cannot tell whether anything is useful, to man without having a general, universal conception of human nature, as well as an historical conception of it. Second, Marx clearly took exception to the *reductionistic* aspects of utilitarianism, insisting on the autonomy of expressive as well as other motives. This is especially evident in his *German Ideology*, where he condemns efforts to reduce all the various forms of human activity—"speech, love, etcetera"—to a relation with utility in which they are not supposed "to have a meaning peculiar to them." Men sometimes "use" things as means to other ends, in an instrumental manner, but not under all conditions. Third, Marx condemned Bentham's version of utilitarianism because it tacitly premised that what is useful for the English bourgeois is useful to all men. "Whatever seems useful to this queer sort of normal man, is regarded as useful in and of itself."⁹ Finally, and central to his analysis of capitalism, is Marx's view of utilitarianism as an *ideology* of the bourgeoisie. Although the bourgeoisie talks about utility, he really means profit, Marx says. The bourgeoisie does not really produce what is useful but what is profitable, what sells. Bourgeois production is commodity production: that is, the production of things that

have "exchange-value," not "use-value." Utilitarianism is a false consciousness of the bourgeoisie, a congenial disguise for its venality.

At bottom, then, Marx's critique of utilitarianism centers on its limited bourgeois form; his is an attack upon the pursuit of individual private profit, underneath which is the more classical hostility toward egoism. For Marx, utilitarianism is largely individual egoism, or the modern disguise of it. Marx therefore does not generalize his critique to all forms of utilitarianism but centers it on the bourgeois form. As early as his youthful paper at the Triers Gymnasium, Marx committed himself to a kind of social utilitarianism, to the importance of being useful to *humanity*. He remarked there that one must choose a vocation "in which we can contribute most to humanity," and he warned that unless we choose vocations for which we are talented, "we will be useless creatures."

Marx is a "revisionist" utilitarian, a social utilitarian; he wants men to be useful to the collectivity, to society as a whole, to what was emerging in history. In his well-known, and deliberately sloganistic, characterization of *advanced* socialism, where he demands, "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs," Marx is, on the one hand, severing the conventional utilitarian correlation between work and reward, but on the other hand, he is also implying that men have a *moral* obligation to be useful to a humane, socialist society. What Marx rejects in Benthamite utilitarianism is precisely its instrumental calculation and expedience; what Marx wishes is a *noncalculating, moral* utilitarianism, where men feel a genuine obligation to be useful to a decent society.

This is a somewhat tensely fine line between Marx's condemnation of individualistic and venal utilitarianism, and his accommodation to a socialized and communal utilitarianism. In some part, this tension was resolved by assigning a different importance to utility in different periods of economic development, holding that it would be ultimately obsolescent under fully developed socialism, where the rule would be, from each according to his abilities, to each according to his need; in earlier, less developed socialism, utility would hold greater sway, and the rule would be, from each according to his abilities, to each according to his work.

The historical outcome was paradoxical. On the one hand, socialists came to view utility as an historically transient and increasingly archaic standard, ultimately destined for the historical rubbish heap; even its current legitimacy was ambiguous and undermined. On the other hand, however, the practical exigencies of successful industrialization and nation-building often led socialists to apply utilitarian standards in daily politics and economic planning, and

the transcendence of utility as a social standard tended to assume a millennial character.

Marxism thus tacitly embodied the conflict between utilitarianism and natural rights that had been characteristic of the middle class, even though it was hostile to commercial paradigms of utility, and critical of the universal claims of natural rights. Marx himself had envisaged the good society that would ultimately appear as one that severed the correlation between a man's usefulness and what he would get; what a man received would no longer be a reward for his usefulness but his birthright as an individual. This, however, was the Marxist image of the future, not the operating standard of the existing socialist movement. Marxism then was ambivalent about utilitarianism; seeking to transcend it in the future, it accommodated to it in the present; opposed to a venal, individualistic utilitarianism, it still accepted the necessity of a social utilitarianism.

THE BINARY FISSION OF MARXISM AND ACADEMIC SOCIOLOGY

A major structural characteristic of Western Sociology develops after the emergence of Marxism; following this, Western Sociology is divided into two camps, each with its own continuous intellectual tradition and distinctive intellectual paradigms, and each greatly insulated from or mutually contemptuous of the other. After the sprawling genius of Saint-Simon, Western Sociology underwent a kind of "binary fission" into two sociologies, each differentiated from the other both theoretically and institutionally, and each the reverse or mirror image of the other. One was Comte's program for a "pure" sociology, which, in time, became Academic Sociology, the university sociology of the middle class, that achieved its fullest institutional development in the United States. The other was the sociology of Karl Marx, or Marxism, the party sociology of intellectuals oriented toward the proletariat, which achieved its greatest success in Eastern Europe.

Rather than defining itself as a "pure" sociology, as Comte had come to define Positivistic Sociology, Marxism affirmed the "unity of theory and practice." Far from appealing to the middle class, as Comte had, Marxism found its constituency not in classes that were rapidly being integrated into the new middle-class society, but in strata that were still outsiders, marginal to it, lowly, disreputable, relatively powerless, and still very far from enjoying the benefits of the new society. In this last respect, Marxism made the most basic rupture with all previous social theory, which, from Plato to Machiavelli, had addressed itself to and sought the support of

Princes, elites, and socially integrated strata. Marxism took the decisive step when it rejected Saint-Simon's proletarian philanthropy, which provides help from the outside, and opted instead for proletarian initiative and proletarian self-determination.

Marxism was no less one-sided than the "positivistic trash" it deplored, but it did develop precisely those interests that Comte had neglected. Instead of conceiving of society, as Comte had, as tending naturally toward stability and order, it regarded modern society as containing "the seeds of its own destruction." Rather than concerning itself with social stability, Marxism conceived of social reality as process; it sought both to understand and to produce social change. Instead of being in love with order and stability, Marxism—at least in its early, prerevisionist stages—had an amplified sensitivity to the sounds of street-fighting. It did not center attention on small "natural" groups, such as the family, that Comte believed would spontaneously maintain social order; Marxism focused on large social classes whose conflicts disrupted social order, and on planned associations, such as political parties and trade unions, which could rationally modify the social world in accordance with the guidance of a social science. Marxism exalted work, knowledge, and involvement; Comtianism prized morality, knowledge, and scientific detachment. The Comtian formula was: Scientific Method \times Hierarchical Metaphysics = Positive Sociology; the Marxian formula was: Scientific Method \times Romantic Metaphysics = Scientific Socialism.

Marx accented the economic and industrial focus already present in Saint-Simon, but he conceptualized it as a matter of economics and power rather than of science and technology. Saint-Simon's position on this had developed as early as 1803, when he had expressly argued that "the haves govern the have-nots, [but] not because they own property; they own property and govern because, collectively, they are superior in enlightenment to the have-nots."¹⁰ Marx, of course, came to maintain the very opposite. Marx saw modern society as "capitalist," in contrast to Saint-Simon's conception of it as "industrial." Marx thus centered attention on the variability of property and power arrangements, and their importance for the further development of industrialization. Marx also focused on the conflicts within the new industrial classes rather than on their common interest in opposing the elites of the old regimes, as had Saint-Simon. Where Saint-Simon had stressed their similarities as industrials, Marx split them into proletarians and capitalists.

Comtianism and Academic Sociology became the sociology and ideology of strata and societies that made the first and quickest breakthroughs into industrialization. Marxism became the sociology adopted by underdeveloped or more slowly developing regions, by

strata least integrated into industrial societies, by classes who sought but were denied their benefits.

Saint-Simon's doctrines thus underwent a binary fission into two basic theoretical systems that persist until this day. One side of Saint-Simon's work went to his French disciples, *Enfantin* and *Bazard*; there it became "Saint-Simonism," which, when fused with the infrastructures of German Romanticism and Hegelianism, contributed to the development of Marxism, in the work of Marx, Engels, Karl Kautsky, Nicolai Bukharin, Leon Trotsky, and V. I. Lenin; and, where it renewed its contact with Hegelianism, it was expressed in the work of Georg Lukács, Antonio Gramsci, and in the contemporary German School of "Critical Sociology" at Frankfurt, including Herbert Marcuse, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Leo Lowenthal, Erich Fromm, and Jürgen Habermas. Thus one side of Western Sociology's binary fission produced a protean tradition whose persistent theme has been a criticism of modern society in the name of man's human potentialities and their fulfillment. The other side of this fission at first crystallized as Positivistic Sociology, which provided the roots of conventional Academic Sociology, as it passed from Comte through Emile Durkheim and English anthropology, to become one of the central sources that Talcott Parsons was to draw upon for his own theoretical synthesis. This continuing tradition of Academic Sociology has, as its perduring theme, the need for social order and moral consensus.

POSITIVISM AND SUBSEQUENT FUNCTIONALISM

Modern Functionalism, which emerges later, in the third and fourth periods of sociological synthesis, has part of its heritage in Sociological Positivism. While modern Functionalism renounces certain assumptions important to earlier Positivism, particularly its evolutionism and cultural lag theory, Functionalism has always remained loyal to Positivism's central "programmatic concept"—a concern with the "positive" functions of institutions—and, moreover, to certain of the core *sentiments* adhering to it. The term "positive" is a resonating programmatic concept, like those found at the heart of all major social theories. To grasp the programmatic concept, to see its fundamental domain assumptions and the sentiments that permeate it, is to grasp much of the power, pathos, and appeal of the theory.

To Saint-Simon and to Comte the "positive" had at least two central implications: on the one side, the "positive" referred to the certain, to knowledge certified by science; on the other, it was the opposite of the "negative," that is, of the "critical" and "destructive"

ideas of the French Revolution and the *philosophes*. In line with the latter, Positivism was, from its beginnings, bent on displaying the "good" that might reside in institutions and customs; it focused on their constructive, functional, useful side. However, under Saint-Simon's formulations, French Positivism never committed itself to the assumption, "once useful, always useful." Saint-Simon's was not a Panglossian optimism that saw this as the best of all possible worlds, but rather was a vision of the modern social world as incomplete, as suffering from immaturity. It was thus a qualified Functionalism, for it did not fear to criticize what it felt were the residual vestiges of an archaic social past still encumbering progress. It also wanted new social arrangements more in keeping with modern industry, which it was hoped could reunite society. Therefore it adopted a more critical stance than that characteristic of later Functionalism. But in its subsequent academic formulations, particularly by Comte, Positivism aimed primarily at blunting the criticisms that the *philosophes* had directed against almost all the institutions of the ancient regime.

Insofar as the "positive" implied an emphasis upon the importance of scientifically certified knowledge, it was using social science as a rhetoric, which might provide a basis for certainty of belief and might assemble a consensus in society. It preached "an end to ideology" under the formulation of "an end to metaphysics." In other words, Positivism assumed that science could overcome ideological variety and diversity of beliefs. Comte had, in this vein, polemicized against the Protestant conception of unlimited liberty of conscience, holding that this led men each to their own differing conclusions and thus to ideological confusion. This disunifying liberty of conscience was, in Comte's view, to be supplanted by a faith in the authority of science that would reestablish the lost social consensus and thus make society whole again.

Comtian Positivism thus manifested the same fascination with consensus and social cohesion, as well as with the ongoing if hidden usefulness of existing institutions, that later characterized Emile Durkheim and A. R. Radcliffe-Brown. The culmination of this abiding Positivist heritage is reached in Talcott Parsons' Structural-Functionalism, which is quite properly celebrated by E. A. Shils as a "consensual" theory. Championing both order and progress, the Comtians had of necessity sought progress within the framework of middle-class property institutions and of the new industrialism, which they regarded as basically sound even if still unfinished. In this continuity of essentially optimistic sentiments and domain assumptions, on the level of infrastructure, modern Functionalism is the legitimate heir of nineteenth-century Sociological Positivism.

THE SCHISM BETWEEN ROMANTIC AND
UTILITARIAN CULTURAL SYNDROMES

In addition to the deep structural split between Academic and Marxist Sociologies, there has been another, less easily crystallizable cultural cleavage of consequence for sociology. Sometimes this split has been formulated in national terms, as a difference between the French and German intellectual traditions (as, for example, by Raymond Aron); sometimes it has been defined as a split between the German idealistic tradition and the more Positivistic tradition of the other Western nations (as, for example, by Ernst Troeltsch). My own view is that this cleavage is only superficially expressed in national terms, for it entails underlying cultural tensions in all Western industrial nations, which manifest themselves in various cultural sectors—painting, music, theater—as well as in sociology.

Historically, one side of this split appeared in Germany no later than the first quarter of the nineteenth century, with the full emergence of the Romantic movement as a counterstatement to rationalism, materialism, Positivism, and utilitarianism; in short, to the culture of the emerging middle class. Romanticism, however, was not simply a reactionary, right-wing opposition to the middle class and its economic order, but had, as it were, an opening to the left. It had revolutionary potentialities that were, for example, developed in the work of Marx, despite his contempt for earlier Romantics. The revolutionary potential of Romanticism derived, in part, from the fact that although basically a critique of industrialism, it *could* as well be used as a critique of capitalism and its culture. As a critique of industrialism in the period of its emergence, however, Romanticism lent itself to use against the middle class by the embattled older elites, especially the aristocracy, and in *that context* it was often reactionary.

Romanticism was nevertheless capable of being blended with a working-class critique of the middle class. There was, as Henri Le Febvre says, a Romanticism of the left as well as the right. Romanticism tended to be predominantly reactionary in its political effect, when it objected to the early industrial development. Romanticism, however, has had liberative potentialities whenever it has sought to transcend the middle-class limitations of utilitarian culture in *advanced* industrial societies; when it has accepted the irrational or nonrational as a source of vitality, without exalting it; and when it has not been elitist. Freudianism has been one expression of such a Romanticism.

Romanticism has, in various ways, been one of the cultural

syndromes around which there have developed styles of sociology discernibly different from the Positivistic or the methodologically empiricist. "Romantic sociologies" have been different both in substantive theory and in methodology, and have placed themselves in tension with other styles that emulate the physical, high science models. I will argue, in another volume, that Romanticism was one of the major cultural influences leading to the development of Marxism. The most important influence of Romanticism on Academic Sociology in Europe, is to be found in the work of Max Weber, while its most important influence on American sociology is through George Herbert Mead and the "Chicago School," on the one side, and Talcott Parsons, on the other.

PERIOD III: CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGY

Classical Sociology emerged during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, a period of consolidating industrialization, large-scale organization, and growing imperialism prior to World War I. Classical Sociology had more diversified national sources than Positivism, including powerful developments in Germany as well as new expressions within the French tradition itself. Nonetheless, each source remained relatively national in character, with little mutual acquaintance and influence among the key contributors. It was also—and this was significant—increasingly institutionalized within the supporting university contexts of the different countries. If the key polemical target of Positivistic Sociology had been the *philosophes* and the French Revolution, the common polemical target of the thinkers of the Classical period was Marxism. Marxism was the crucial intellectual development, and socialism the key political development, that, as antagonists, differentiated the central concerns of the first and third periods in the development of Western Sociology. Classical Sociology was the great achievement of the middle class of Western Europe, in the late nineteenth century, when the individual, competitive entrepreneur was being supplanted by increasingly large-scale and bureaucratized industrial organization, and when in general, the middle class was increasingly threatened by the rise of Marxist socialism.

THE DECLINE OF EVOLUTIONISM AND RISE OF FUNCTIONALISM

Academic Sociology in the Classical period was structurally differentiated, in various ways, from that of the Positivistic period; one of the most important was the atrophying of social evolutionism both in Emile Durkheim's work and in Max Weber's, and its replacement by "comparative" study. This is one reason why Herbert Spencer, with his dominating emphasis on evolutionism, subsequently failed to be regarded as a characteristic thinker of the Classical period. In Germany, especially as epitomized by Max Weber, comparative studies largely focused on Western European societies, or on literate, great civilizations, such as India's. In France, however, comparative studies increasingly incorporated, as in Durkheim's school, materials from nonliterate societies; here they moved toward a juncture with anthropology, and became influential in the development of English anthropology through the work of A. R. Radcliffe-Brown. The decline of evolutionism and the rise of Functionalism were complementary, and shaped the development of sociology and anthropology alike.

The movement away from Positivist evolutionism and toward Functionalism may be examined in detail in Durkheim's work, particularly in comparison with Comte's. Perhaps the crux of the difference was related to the fact that Comte had felt a deep ambivalence toward the past: he was both more linked to it and more afraid of it than Durkheim. Comte had conceived of the new Positivist society as only one stage in an evolutionary process, although he had believed it the highest stage of development that mankind could reach. He knew that in France this highest stage was, in his day, only half-born, and was still floundering between a future not yet fully arrived and a past not yet wholly and safely dead. The basic threat to the new society was, in the early Positivist view, from the archaic remnants of the past still potent in the inevitably incomplete and immature present. In short, there was postulated a theory of "cultural lag."

Durkheim, however, was operating in a decidedly different situation, and it shaped his historical imagination quite differently. Modern industrial society was far more developed in his time than it had been in Comte's; it had reached and gone beyond the takeoff point. The active threat of powerful Restorationist elites was therefore gone, even though "vestigial" institutions remained. The danger, in brief, was no longer seen as located in something essentially of the past, but as more fully rooted in the present.

One of the areas in which this was expressed most clearly was in Durkheim's conception of patterns of inheritance as an "archaic

survival." Clearly, however, Durkheim did not regard inheritance in anything like the sense in which Saint-Simon had seen the restored monarchy. It was inconceivable that Durkheim would make the same kind of statement about inheritance that Saint-Simon had made about the monarchy. Yet Durkheim did see inheritance as generating tensions, and as no longer historically necessary, although visibly rooted in the present. The brunt of Durkheim's critique of inheritance saw it as doomed because it has a manifest inappropriateness to other aspects of the society, particularly its contractual ethics, and because it has an injurious effect upon the modern division of labor. In conceiving of inheritance as a "survival," he presented an image of it as a fish out of water, doomed to die a natural death, rather than as something having to be actively and forcefully deposed through revolutionary change. It would be gradually and peacefully closed down, step by step, painlessly put to sleep by a euthanasia administered by guild-like, syndicalist corporations. Removing it required no bloody conflict.

For Durkheim, then, the basic threat to modern society did not come from still powerful remnants of the past, actively hostile and dangerous to the present. He was ready to relinquish this half of the Positivist theory of cultural lag, to forgo that part of it that blamed current ills on the past. To repeat, it was not that he did not see inheritance as causing trouble, but that he did not see it as deeply threatening. Certainly he did not consider it nearly as important as the growth of *anomie*, or the decline of a binding morality that would restrain men. His central concern was not economic poverty, but the poverty of morality.

The important question is how Durkheim viewed this decline of morality. In particular, did he see it in terms of the cultural lag theory, as an expression of an insufficiency natural to a young society, and sooner or later to be overcome *spontaneously*, through its own natural process of maturation? Not entirely. His refusal to take this tack was implicit in his planned effort to surmount the problem *now*, through the deliberate development of syndicalist corporations. This implied that the "poverty of morality" could be overcome in the *present*; it need not wait for the future. In short, while there was nothing in the present that would make this remedy inevitable, there was also nothing in the present that would make it impossible. The outcome depended not upon a future unfolding and maturation, but upon the present and on decisions in it.

Durkheim was thus *beginning* to close down the theory of cultural lag from both ends. It was neither the threat from the past that was most serious, nor the *necessary* incompleteness of the present. Durkheim had no need to curse the past or pray to the future, for things would not be radically different in it. The really

serious dangers to society, for Durkheim, were rooted in the inherent insatiability of man, and these would remain the same for all societies and be unchanged in the future. From Durkheim's standpoint, socialism could bring no significant change in this, the essential character of man. Man would be ever the same; there was, in effect, no point in looking forward to the future for a radical change in society. It was the present, therefore, that counted. This had much the same implication as Max Weber's view of modern industrialization as being essentially "bureaucratic" in nature, and his consequent prediction that socialism would be no less bureaucratic than capitalism. There was really no choice, in this respect, between socialism and the present society.

Socialism and Marxism had taken a very future-oriented time perspective, adopting an historical and evolutionary emphasis in which it was stressed that the present society would inevitably be superseded by a radically different one. To this, Durkheim polemically replied that social science was still far too immature to see the future. It was precisely in connection with his polemic against socialism that his opposition to an evolutionary outlook that attempted to predict the future was most explicitly formulated, and his counteraffirmation, that sociology is concerned about what is or was, was most emphatically advanced. While Comte had raised the motto of "Order and Progress," Durkheim, in contrast, felt constrained to place even less emphasis upon "progress" than had Comte; he came to invest his energies almost exclusively in the analysis of "order." In short, Durkheim began to truncate the future orientation of Comtianism in the course of his polemic against the conceived future projected by Marxism and socialism. He thus began the consolidation of sociology as a social science of the synchronic present, which came to culmination in contemporary Functionalism.

At the same time that Durkheim foreshortened the future-oriented perspective of early Positivism, he also began to revise its conception of the past. In his distinction between two forms of society, the organically and mechanically solidary, it was clear that the former referred primarily to modern industrial societies. Indeed, the distinction was, in one way, intended to be a defense of their inherent stability. "Mechanical solidarity," on the other hand, referred to almost *all* earlier societies, or at least to many that had existed at widely different periods. Mechanical solidarity lumped together societies as widely spaced and different as feudalism and tribalism.

The dichotomy between organically and mechanically solidary societies was, in effect, a distinction between "now" and "then." Modern industrial society was being conceptually cut out of its

former place in a multiphased series of societies; it was being used as a central point of reference, which gave all that had come before its value and interest. The present was being constituted as an *island* out of time; the past was no longer to be thought to embody its own significant *temporal* gradations and developments, but to be treated primarily as a convenient *contrast* with the present rather than as a preparation for it. Here evolutionism was giving way to "comparative studies."

In some ways, this was similar to the Comtian impulse to see the evolutionary development of society as having come to climactic culmination in Positivist society. Yet, the historical sense of Comtianism, and of classical Positivism in general, had been much stronger; it had, in fact, given birth to new schools of historiography, such as that of Augustin Thierry, Saint-Simon's pupil. If it had viewed the past primarily as preparation for the coming of the Positivist society, it had also insisted upon doing justice to it, by studying the step-by-step, phase-by-phase, temporal process by which Positivism had finally emerged. To Durkheim, however, the past had little value, except when it could, by comparison, help him to understand the present.

Durkheim's move away from evolutionism toward comparative studies had one important intellectual advantage. It became a matter of indifference whether a past society had any known historical linkage with the present, and it thus widened the range of societies that might be considered of interest. This meant that sociology no longer had to confine itself to the European experience or even to great civilizations; it could now include in its comparative data even *tribal* societies. It was in this broadening of his studies to include tribal societies that Durkheim made a most important intellectual advance beyond Comte. This development of interest in tribal societies did not, however, occur in a social vacuum, but was concurrent with the increasing activity of the European powers in Africa and elsewhere, and concurrent with the intensive development of nineteenth-century colonialization. Both of these developments, the European colonialization of other continents and the development of Durkheim's sociology in a nonevolutionary direction capable of incorporating tribal studies, contributed to the critical shift that was to occur in anthropology, particularly English anthropology.

DIFFERENTIATION OF THE GERMAN AND FRENCH RESPONSES TO UTILITARIANISM

The broadening of the concept of "utility," begun by the Positivists, was carried forward and incorporated into Functionalism by

Durkheim's work, and then diffused into English anthropology. The emerging "functional" theory sought to show how the persistence or change of any social institution or custom had to be understood in terms of its *ongoing* consequences for surrounding institutions and behavior. It had to be explained in terms of its place in and its contributions to the larger society of which it was a part. In other words: "function" was a broad and subtle way of talking about the *usefulness* of *all* (not merely economic) "social" relations, behaviors, and beliefs.

The successful appeal of Functionalism has rested, in part, on its ability to resonate congenially the practical, utilitarian sentiments of men socialized into a dominant middle-class culture, men who feel that things and people must be, and are, legitimated by their ongoing usefulness. Being thus at variance with sentiments of aristocratic insouciance and traditionalism, as well as with socialist critiques of middle-class society as entailing exploitation based on power rather than utility, Sociological Functionalism was congenial to the middle class in its struggle against the new masses and, if need be, against the old elites. The revisionist broadening of utilitarianism occurred mostly in France.

However, Functionalism was seriously alien to cultures, such as the German, having a massive infusion of Romanticism and a mandarin disdain for middle-class culture: Weber rejects Functionalism. German sociology was thus characterized by a radical polemic against utilitarianism, rather than by a broadening and sublimation of it. Culminating around the turn of the century in Max Weber's sociology of religion, it stressed the importance of ideas in general and of religious ethics in particular, as influences upon social development and human conduct. Rather than accounting for social action in terms of its functions or useful consequences, it emphasized that social outcomes were the result of men's efforts to conform with ideas and ideals. As had Romanticism, Weber's emphasis was on the autonomy and importance of the ideas to which men inwardly committed themselves, and on how these shaped history. Weber's position was, in large part, a polemic against the Marxist conception that ideologies were a "super-structural" adaptation to the economic "infrastructure." In contrast, Weber argued that the economic system of Western Europe, capitalism itself, was the unanticipated consequence of conformity with the Protestant Ethic.

Weber's valuation of the utilitarian traditions of middle-class culture was more hostile than was Durkheim's, while Durkheim's was in turn more critical than had been the sociologists' of the Positivist era. Both Weber and Durkheim agreed on the importance of moral values in producing profound, even if unintended, con-

sequences: capitalism for the former, suicide for the latter. Both thus commonly stressed the importance of the *nonrational* in men. Yet there were important ways in which their views of moral values differed. For one, Durkheim stressed the inhibiting and restraining function of moral values; he saw them as limiting men's appetites and thus as preventing anomic insatiability. Weber, however, tended to accent the energizing, motivational significance of moral values; he saw them as stimuli to human striving. For Weber, values express and ignite passions rather than restrain appetites.

Durkheim also stressed the role of moral values, when shared, as a source of social and specifically "mechanical" solidarity; Weber saw men as led into conflict in the defense of their differing values. Durkheim thus regarded moral values as pattern-maintaining, socially equilibrating forces; Weber focused on the power of values to disrupt established boundaries, patterns, and equilibria. For Weber values were significant in lending meaning and purpose to individual life; they have a human significance. But for Durkheim their significance was primarily social: they contribute to the solidarity of society, and to the integration of individuals into society.

Underlying the different treatment of values by Durkheim and Weber was the difference in their critiques of utilitarian culture. Durkheim feared that it would unleash appetites, inflame men with an insatiable lust for material satisfactions and acquisitions. In effect, he saw industrialism as turbulence-generating, anarchy-inducing: in short, as undermining social order. Weber's concern was the very opposite. His essential fear was not of social disorder but of entropy, lifelessness, lack of arousal, lack of passionate involvement. Weber readily acknowledged the efficiency and productivity of modern bureaucratic society, but he feared that it entailed a routinization of life, in which men accommodate themselves to the social machinery and become lifeless, dependent grey cogs. It was not the threat to social order that Weber most feared, but the successful creation of a social order so powerful that it would be autonomous of men; he is, in short, concerned with the problem of human alienation in a utilitarian society. Durkheim, in contrast, regarded this same externality and autonomy of social structures as a normal and healthful condition, needed to constrain men.

Durkheim adopted the position of sublimated, revisionist utilitarianism, insisting on the *usefulness* of the division of labor. He emphasized that it was not only useful economically, as a way of increasing productivity, but also had another, more fundamental function or use, the production of social and specifically "organic"

solidarity. Division of labor would do this not so much by enhancing men's individual satisfactions as by making them dependent upon one another and by encouraging in them a chastening sense of dependence on the social whole. It would restrain men. Under "normal" conditions the new utilitarian culture could potentially have a benign effect. But, added Durkheim, the modern organization of the division of labor was not yet normal; what was needed was a new morality that would restrain men's appetites, regulate and interconnect occupational specializations, and make men willingly accept differential roles and rewards. A shared morality that would accomplish this was necessary for the solidarity of modern societies, for only a moral force would be accepted willingly by men. In effect, then, Durkheim's treatment of morality, as well as of the division of labor, focused on its functional importance as necessary and useful for the maintenance of society and social order.

Morality, for Durkheim, is that which contributes to or is useful for social solidarity. Durkheim thus conceived of morality in a way that was congruent with the bourgeois sentiment for the useful. Far from simply being one of the higher refinements of culture, an elegant but useless luxury, morality was held to be essential to social existence. Like those who say that "nothing is more practical than a good theory," Durkheim was saying that nothing is more useful to society than morality. Thus, for all of his polemic against what he correctly regarded as Saint-Simon's utilitarianism, his own critique was itself limited by middle-class utilitarian sentiments of the most popular sort. Such a rationale for morality would have been anathema to Weber, who saw its essential justification in the *meaning* with which it endowed life rather than in its usefulness to society.

CONTINUITIES BETWEEN POSITIVISM AND FUNCTIONALISM

At bottom, Functionalism sought to show that social customs, relationships, and institutions persisted because, and only because, they had some social "function," which is to say, an ongoing usefulness, even if this was unrecognized by those who were involved in them. Functionalists implied that if social arrangements persisted, this could only be because they facilitated exchanges in which all parties involved were benefiting. Usually, however, Functionalists failed to consider what, from the Marxist perspective, is crucial: whether the measure of what is received bears any correspondence to what is given. In short, Functionalism dodged

the problem of "exploitation," that is, of giving less than one receives, and instead simply asserted that social arrangements which survive must, in some degree and in some way, be contributing to the welfare of society. It was the job of the Functionalist, sociologist or anthropologist, to exercise his ingenuity to find out how this was being done. The implicit slogan of Functionalism was: Survival implies ongoing usefulness—search it out!

Functionalism thus served to defend existing social arrangements on *nontraditional* grounds, against the criticism that they were based on power or force. From the Functionalist perspective there was a tacit morality in things that justified their existence: the morality of usefulness. Functionalism also sought to show that even if given arrangements were not useful economically, they might still be useful in other, noneconomic ways; in short, they might be *socially* functional. Thus, they attempted to demonstrate that new economic arrangements, such as the intensified division of labor, were not advantageous simply for individual selfish gain, but also had a social usefulness, contributing to the very solidarity of society. Thus, from Positivism to Functionalism, sociology embodied the standard of social utilitarianism: usefulness to society.

This continuity from Positivism to Functionalism will be missed only if one fails to distinguish philosophical utilitarianism from popular, cultural utilitarianism. The latter does not refer only to behavior that is *intended* to be useful, and deliberately and rationally pursues courses of action that optimize desired outcomes; this is only one type of utilitarianism, which might be called "anticipatory" or rational utilitarianism. There is, however, another kind of popular middle-class utilitarianism: a "retroactive" utilitarianism that judged social arrangements in terms of their ongoing consequences, and was quite prepared to believe them legitimate whenever they were useful, without insisting that this utility be planned in advance. This is clearly evidenced by eighteenth-century political economy, which held that individual decisions on the market had advantageous, albeit unintended, consequences for society as a whole: that is, "private vices, public benefits." Popular utilitarianism, then, entailed a concern with judging actions in terms of their useful consequences, but it did not always require that these be anticipated prior to their occurrence.

In both anticipatory and retroactive utilitarianism, the standard of judgment was the useful. It was the sentiment for the useful, not the philosophical theory of utilitarianism, that was central to the bourgeois polemic against the traditionalism of the old regimes. Popular utilitarianism served to draw a line between the parasitical idlers of the old regime and the hard-working middle class, whose new political claims it served to legitimate.

THE PROBLEM OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY IN ENGLAND

The considerations advanced above need to be related to certain peculiarities of English social science: Functionalism has been incorporated primarily in English anthropology rather than sociology; indeed, it is only rather recently that England has developed an academically institutionalized sociology as such. The absence of Functional Sociology, and the weak institutional development of sociology in general, may seem perplexing from a standpoint such as our own, which stresses the link between Functional Sociology and utilitarianism. For, one of the distinctive intellectual developments of the middle class in Britain was precisely its utilitarianism. Why, then, is there a Functional Anthropology in Britain, but not a Functional Sociology? This needs to be explained in a parsimonious manner, consistent with the presence of Functional Sociology elsewhere. That is, the explanation must account for the presence of a Functional Sociology in certain cases, as well as for its absence in others.

Perry Anderson's thoughts on this problem are valuable and relevant here. He suggests that the English middle class, being "traumatized by the French Revolution and fearful of the nascent working-class movement," accommodated itself to the English aristocracy.¹¹ Instead of wresting hegemony from the aristocracy, the British middle class fused with it to form a "composite" ruling class. British culture therefore remained under aristocratic influence, and middle-class utilitarianism thus never became the dominant *cultural* influence. "The hegemonic ideology of this society was a much more aristocratic combination of 'traditionalism' and 'empiricism,' intensely hierarchical in its emphasis, which accurately registered the history of the dominant agrarian class."¹²

In short, the English aristocracy fostered a culture that was dissonant with a utility-rooted justification for its own preeminent position. The English aristocracy's mandate has never rested primarily on its usefulness to society or to the other classes, or on the social functions it performs. (It took an American sociologist, E. A. Shils, to advance such a view of the English monarchy.) Like other aristocracies, the English did not believe that its social position was justified by hard work and diligent, specialized achievement, but by its gentlemanly cultivation and breeding, the inherited grace that endowed it with a confident sense of its own "natural" superiority. The aristocracy's eminence and prerogatives were held to derive from what history had made it, from what it *was*, and not merely from what it now *did* in society. A sociology that incorporated middle-class sentiments of utility and of legiti-

macy would subvert rather than sustain such an aristocracy, as was perfectly plain as early as Saint-Simon's parable of the sudden death of the French Court.

A Functional Sociology would be dissonant with the English aristocracy's traditional modes of legitimation. It would also be unattractive to the British middle class, or at least the upper middle class, which merged itself with this aristocracy; which married and bought itself into the aristocracy's style of life and thus accepted family lineage and "connections" as legitimate, and generally placed itself under the *cultural hegemony* of the aristocracy.

This fact bears upon the absence of a Functional Sociology in Great Britain, but it still does not clarify why there has been hardly any academically powerful sociology in Britain. Perry Anderson suggests that this is related to the absence of a powerful Marxist tradition in Britain:

The political threat which had so largely influenced the birth of sociology [I would say, Classical Sociology] on the continent—the rise of socialism—did not materialize in England . . . the dominant class in Britain was thus never moved to produce a counter-totalizing thought by the danger of revolutionary socialism.¹³

To summarize this in terms of my own formulations above: Functional Sociology is a social theory consistent with the middle class's need for an ideological justification of its own social legitimacy and with its drive to maintain a social identity distinguishable from that of the established aristocracy, at least where such an aristocracy existed. A Functional Sociology, therefore, would not be congenial to a middle class—such as the British—that, fusing with the aristocracy under the latter's cultural hegemony, did not seek a distinctive ideological justification for its legitimacy, since it adopted the aristocracy's, and, far from wanting to maintain an independent social identity of its own, wished to merge with the aristocracy. Correspondingly, the English middle class's domestic influence and legitimacy were not, during the Classical period, threatened from below by a powerful revolutionary socialism or by a systematic Marxism that would stimulate it to formulate a systematic theoretical defense of itself and of its society.

FUNCTIONALISM IN ENGLISH ANTHROPOLOGY

The central role that Functionalism came to play in English anthropology was acceptable under these social conditions because anthropology's focal concern is not with *domestic* English society but with its colonies elsewhere. In this respect, English Functional

Anthropology remains in the tradition set by earlier English evolutionism:

Broadly speaking, it is true of all the evolutionary social theorists that they could recognize the social functions of irrational, absurd, and superstitious practices only provided that they were someone else's, or at least, if present in their own society, that they were merely transitory.¹⁴

English evolutionary anthropology had largely been an armchair assimilation from secondary sources provided by historians, travelers, and administrators, and it had lacked funds either for field research or for the support of the researcher. As Huxley wrote to A. C. Haddon in the 1880's, "I do not see any way by which a devotee of anthropology is to come at the bread—let alone the butter."¹⁵

Evolutionary anthropology had been shaped in the period of English dominance, during the consolidation of Empire. It had been created by a society for whom a large part of the world was their domain, their labor supply, and their protected market; it was, in short, made in the world of a confident and ascending middle class, with solid prospects. Functionalism, however, arose following World War I, which is to say, against the backdrop of a violent challenge to English dominion and Empire; it arose when English precedence was no longer taken for granted, when the English could no longer feel confident that their own society represented the culmination of an evolutionary process from which they might look down benignly upon "lower" peoples. Following World War I, the English future was felt as uncertain and was not to be savored in anticipation: doubtful prospects foreshortened future-oriented thinking. In this setting, the prospect was not the inevitable uplifting of backward colonies in their common evolution toward the future; the task was now to hold on to the colonies and to keep them under control. The sanguine expectation of progress gave way to the grim problem of order.

Moreover, if it was now not at all sure that the "absurd" practices of contemporary, domestic English society were transitory imperfections, to be gently erased by inexorable progress, how then could they be happily viewed? Functionalism replied that they really were not absurd at all but actually possessed a *hidden* usefulness and were, at bottom, functional. Functionalism, then, emerged in a Europe where there was a sense of the precariousness of society and a fear that any tampering with the status quo might have dangerously ramifying consequences. Thus, in one of his first papers, Malinowski argued that culture was an integrated whole

comprised of interdependent parts; touch any one of them, he suggested, and there is danger of a general collapse.¹⁶ The emergence of Functionalism, particularly in anthropology, thus corresponded to the changing structure of sentiments that was becoming pervasive in Europe.

The two most important anthropologists to move toward a fully Functional Anthropology were A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and Bronislaw Malinowski. Each of them was deeply influenced by Durkheim's work, although each in a different way. Radcliffe-Brown's development of Functional Anthropology was very similar to Durkheim's work, centering as it did on the problem of social order in primitive societies. There is hardly any institution of primitive society that Radcliffe-Brown did not view primarily in terms of its usefulness for social solidarity, be it dancing or subsistence-getting.

For his part, however, Malinowski was engaged in a persistent polemic against Durkheim, particularly because of Durkheim's tendency to spiritualize and reify society. Malinowski sought to link social institutions with species needs, which he saw as foci around which institutions develop. It was precisely Malinowski's reductionistic tendency to find the roots of social institutions in the common needs of individuals that was at first more congenial to the English, because it resonated persisting traditions of English empiricism and individualism; indeed, it was even consistent with Spencer's version of evolutionism, which held that "every phenomenon exhibited by an aggregation of men originates in some quality of man himself."¹⁷

Individualistic though it was, however, there was also a strain of Marxist influence in Malinowski's views; stripped of its reductionism, Malinowski's conception of the rooting of social institutions in universal needs of the individual echoed Marx's concern about "species" characteristics as foci of social development. There are other places in which Malinowski's borrowing from Marx, characteristically unacknowledged, seems even plainer. For example, Malinowski stressed that black magic is an instrument of social control primarily available to people of power and wealth in primitive societies, and not uniformly accessible to all.

Malinowski insisted that the "oedipal complex" is not universal and argued that the form it assumed in the Trobriand Islands, where the child feels hostility against his uncle rather than his father, was due to the *power* the uncle has over him and to the constraining authority he exercises. Malinowski also polemicized against Durkheim's view of the sources of social solidarity, arguing that even in primitive societies this is due not to the awe in which the group's "collective conscience" is regarded, but rather to the practical patterns of reciprocity through which members of the

group *exchange gratifications*. Typically, when Malinowski sought to explain how primitive norms were actually activated and enforced, he noted that this was not an automatic process: the group as a whole did not recoil in collective hostility against those who had offended its moral beliefs, but rather the reaction was mediated by the vested interests of particular individuals who had personally and directly suffered as a result of the offender's behavior.

The difference between Malinowski with his undertow of Marxism and the more orthodox Durkheimian, Radcliffe-Brown, is epitomized in their differing approaches to magic. Malinowski noted that the people he had studied, the Trobrianders, tended to use more magic when they went on hazardous deep-sea fishing expeditions than when they fished the more protected lagoon waters. He concluded that magic functioned to reduce the greater anxieties induced by deep-sea fishing, and was less used in lagoon fishing because the situation there was more controllable. Malinowski held that magic generally served to reduce anxieties that were not technologically controllable, and thereby enabled men to carry out their duties. Radcliffe-Brown, in contrast, focused on magical practices surrounding childbirth and family behavior, and he concluded that magic did not *reduce* anxieties but actually heightened them, and thereby *solemnized* the activities with which they were associated. To Malinowski, then, magic functioned to allow men to go about their business and get their work done; to Radcliffe-Brown, in rather Durkheimian spirit, magic functioned to infuse certain activities with sentiments of solemnity, awe, and humility, ceremonially communicating the high pathos that the society bestowed upon the activity.

Both Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown agreed, however, on an anti-evolutionary view. A practice, custom, or belief was to be interpreted in terms of its present and ongoing functions in the surrounding society. Nothing, in effect, was any longer to be seen as an "archaic survival," which is to say, nothing was to be understood as a relic that had once been but no longer was useful. The anthropologist was no longer to look to the past in order to understand the present. He was not to reconstruct dubious evolutionary stages in which he could locate and interpret things still presently observable, in order to account for their present condition. In short, they were dealing a death blow to the Positivist's theory of cultural lag.

Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown are the bridge between Durkheim and modern Sociological Functionalism. Although contemporary Functionalists have sought to purify their discipline of "unnecessary assumptions," which they attribute to these anthropologists, we cannot overestimate their abiding influence. For one,

Anthropological Functionalism powerfully consolidated the anti-evolutionary and *comparativist* orientation that had begun to emerge in Durkheim. Later Sociological Functionalists were deeply influenced by the anthropologists' polemic against evolutionism, especially where it coincided with a similar vector in their own sociological tradition. Modern Sociological Functionalism of the fourth period emerged bereft of focalized historical interests, unconcerned with future-gazing, and embedded in a timeless present.

Having adopted the ahistorical standpoint of an Anthropological Functionalism that often had no choice, since it studied societies without a recorded history, Sociological Functionalism broke entirely with evolutionism, adopting this view even of literate societies for which there was an ample historical record. Influenced by social anthropology's reliance upon methods of first-hand field observation of ongoing social processes, Sociological Functionalists tended increasingly to confine themselves to what could be observed at first-hand. However, they were not able to accomplish what many anthropologists could: to study entire societies seen as a whole. It was possible for anthropologists to do this, despite their use only of first-hand, detailed observation, because the societies they studied were often no larger than several hundred people. But, committed to such methods and to avoiding historical depth, sociologists would find it increasingly difficult to study societies as a whole.

Anthropological Functionalists, furthermore, commonly investigated societies that had not yet developed a modern politics. Thus, in effect, as Durkheim had appeared to cleanse Functionalism of religion, so Anthropological Functionalists appeared to cleanse it of political relevance. Functionalism was not only becoming secularized, it was on the verge of becoming innocuous. Of course, one could not use primitive societies to study modern problems, such as the development of modern socialism, industrialism, or the class struggle. Yet there were other problems of contemporary relevance that anthropologists might have studied, had they been disposed to do so. These other problems they largely chose to ignore, including above all the problems of imperialism and of the conditions underlying native struggles for national independence. That they shied away from these problems was not due to the absence of opportunity. It was rather that this anthropology operated within the context of an imperialism and colonialism that were under increasing pressure.

Distinct from its intellectual intentions, then, the societal, subsidiary task of this anthropology was often to facilitate the administration of tribal people, whose ways were radically different from and troublesomely unfamiliar to English administrators. Functional

Anthropology thus lived something of a double life. If anthropologists played a role for English colonialism, they also often viewed themselves as the paternalistic protectors of indigenous tribal institutions and culture. Often they sought to defend native institutions from the moral indignation and the political expedience of English administrators. In this vein, for example, Malinowski defended black magic among the Trobrianders, viewing it as an indigenous instrument of social control which, as such, should not be attacked by English administrators out of moral zeal.

Anthropological Functionalism based itself on the study of dominated cultures, many of which were still far from national independence and industrialization, a goal which their colonial administrators did not want them to approach. The task of colonial administrators was not to facilitate change but to keep things stable and orderly. They wanted to do this with the smallest investment in state apparatus and the least cost of policing and administration. The colonies, after all, were not meant to be run at a loss. English administrators therefore wanted and welcomed a native social system that was orderly and self-maintaining, and Anthropological Functionalism, which was concerned with these problems, was relevant and congenial.

Yet while administrators and anthropologists commonly wanted these cultures to remain much as they had been, the administrators also wanted natives to pay taxes and to be available for labor. These, of course, were contradictory policies, for inevitably native contact with English values and technology brought change. Early Functional Anthropology usually paid little attention to the relations between the colonial power and the native society, and, when it did, it was commonly viewed as a form of "culture contact," seen from the perspective of its disorganizing impact on the native society. Anthropological Functionalism did not view native societies as being in the process of a lawful evolution, as, for example, the early Sociological Positivists had viewed nineteenth-century France. They did not take it for granted that these cultures were destined to be industrialized or independent. They often counseled tolerance of native institutions and sought to preserve them, sometimes from romantic and sometimes simply from humane motives.

Although Anthropological Functionalism was sometimes critical of English practices toward native institutions, this was marginal criticism, rarely objecting to European domination as such, but only seeking to make this domination better informed and more restrained. Correspondingly, it rarely adopted a critical attitude toward traditional native institutions, but rather more commonly defended them in romantic ways. Its basic posture toward both European and native societies was therefore essentially compatible

with the maintenance of European dominance and with the inhibition of the political autonomy and industrialization of colonial areas. And this was compatible with the basic policies of colonialism. While some Functional Anthropologists conceived it as their societal task to educate colonial administrators, none thought it their duty to tutor native revolutionaries.

In approaching English anthropology, it is vital to understand the gentlemanly self-image of its practitioners and of its audience of administrators. As Duncan Macrae remarks, "The subject . . . has prestige. It is associated with colonial administration—traditionally a career for gentlemen . . ." ¹⁸ That Malinowski was the scion of a Polish aristocracy never impeded his career or barred his way in English society. Indeed, Malinowski's own views were often informed by assumptions congenial to the aristocracy: he viewed those who wished to outlaw war among native peoples in something of the manner in which the fox-hunting aristocracy views those who wish to put an end to their sport; he had an aristocrat's understanding of the practical value of religion for the maintenance of social order; and he had a Burkean feeling for the wisdom of tradition. "Destroy tradition," he warns, "and you will deprive the collective organism of its protective shell and give it over to the slow inevitable process of dying out."

Aristocratic assumptions were thus combined with a view of society as an organism bound together by the uses or functions that each part contributes to the others. In effect, Malinowski mobilized traditional bourgeois assumptions about utility to defend native society from criticism by this very middle-class *morality*, which he termed the "convention-bound, parochial, middle-class mind." There is, as it were, in Malinowski, a foreground sound and a background sound. Underneath his aristocrat's contempt for the parochialism of middle-class morality was an appreciation of the possible universality of middle-class utilitarianism. And underneath the anthropologist's explicit defense of native institutions was the aristocrat's tacit defense of aristocratic institutions.

Malinowski viewed native institutions from the standpoint of the aristocrat within the anthropologist, with a submerged sense of an affinity between the customs of the aristocracy and those of native societies: dinosaur called to dinosaur. This sensed affinity derived from the fact that both groups' customs were vulnerable to a popular criticism that could condemn each of them as archaic, outmoded, and useless. Thus Malinowski's view of one group's customs resonates his view of the other's; his defense of native customs is *seen* to have implication for the defense of aristocratic customs. Malinowski's emphasis on the functionality of *all* customs—his "universal Functionalism"—was a generalized statement of

a narrower impulse, namely, to defend precisely those institutions that seemed devoid of utility to the middle class. It was, above all, a defense of that which the lower middle class regarded as *non-rational*, whether in distant colonies or in England itself. Indeed, Malinowski himself expressly drew the parallel between the "savage customs" of native peoples and "silly" English games, such as cricket, golf, football, and fox-hunting. These were not "wasting time," insisted Malinowski; indeed, an ethnological view would show that "to wipe out sport, or even to undermine its influence, would be a crime." Aristocratic custom, style of life, and leisure, no less than native institutions, now had a common theoretical defense. Behind English Anthropological Functionalism, then, was a hidden impulse to defend the aristocracy against a narrowly conceived bourgeois standard of utility, *in terms of a more broadly conceived standard of social utility.*

To have overtly and systematically defended the aristocracy's position in English society in terms of its ongoing usefulness would have been tactlessly at variance with the self-conceptions of both aristocrats and gentleman-scholars. In short, a Functional *Sociology* would have to join the issue in an overt way, on the level of public discussion. A Functional *Anthropology*, however, need never do this in any pointed and embarrassing way; but it could, and did, establish a tacit line of defense for the aristocracy in terms of the functional methodology it developed, if not in terms of the specific societies to which this methodology was applied.

The domestic implications of this functional ideology were not lost upon the peers who shared its universe of discourse. If English Anthropological Functionalism devoted its focal attention to searching out the hidden functionality of native institutions, there was also, within its subsidiary awareness, a ready sense of the manner in which this same defense might serve gentlemen at home. The utilitarianism on which this defense rested, however, was not the shopkeeper's concern for private gain. It was not a utilitarianism that was desirous, as Sir Henry Maine once put it, of "turning Her Majesty's government into what tradesmen call a 'concern.'" Nonetheless, it remained interested in all that was "useful" for preserving a way of life with arranged privilege. It was a sublimated social utilitarianism blended with a traditionalistic sensibility, concerned to receive and responsibly hand on Empire and to be useful in its governance.

Functionalism, then, was certainly not the ideology of an unreconstructed, highly individualistic, and highly competitive bourgeoisie; the social ideology of this class was "social Darwinism." Instead, Functionalism became the social theory of an upper middle class that did not stress overt individualistic competition

because in England its aspirations were to gentility and to an alliance with the aristocracy. And elsewhere the middle class did not stress competition, for it was becoming involved in large-scale industrial organizations with growing requirements for cooperation and integration.

As the middle class becomes constrained to attend to the growing demands of the working class and of other social strata marginal to modern industrialism, it increasingly adopts the standpoint of a *social* rather than individual utilitarianism. It thus moves toward convergence with sociology's own earlier anticipations of social utilitarianism and of the Welfare State. Under these changing social conditions, sociology should receive more sustained support from the middle class, whose own assumptions and sentiments are becoming consistent with it. In short, sociology should come into its own under the Welfare State.

THE EXTRUSION OF RELIGION

One of the important and new characteristics of Academic Sociology in the Classical period was its secularization. In the first, or Positivistic period the characteristic sociologists had treated religion as an area requiring practical pronouncement. Both Saint-Simon and Comte had capped their intellectual careers by proposing and providing detailed plans for new religions of humanity. They regarded their religious plans as legitimate enterprises for students of society such as themselves, and as necessary to give practical implementation to their sociological studies. The "religion of humanity" was the *applied* sociology of Positivism.

By the third or Classical period of sociology, however, the religion of humanity disappeared as a distinct structure in the work of sociologists and was, in effect, replaced by the sociology of religion. The creating of new religions was succeeded by the study of established or historical religions, which were dealt with in terms and standards relevant to the scholarly role as such. Part of what was involved here was not only a change in the subjects now studied, but also a change in the nature of the scholarly role itself. Religion was examined not in the critical manner of the "pre-Marxians," Feuerbach and Strauss, but in the "dispassionate" spirit of the professional scholar.

This does not mean, however, that sociologists of the Classical period viewed religion as just one more social phenomenon, no more important to society than any other. Religion continued to be attributed a very special importance in the affairs of men, but this was now expressed in the formulations and assumptions of schol-

arly theory and research. The religious concerns of sociology became sublimated and secularized, but they did not disappear. This transition can be clearly seen in the differences between Comte's and Durkheim's treatment of religion.

In the course of his studies of religion, Durkheim developed a conception of the requirements of social order, which premised that society itself was the godhead and that social order depended on the creation and maintenance of a set of moral orientations that were essentially religious in character. In Durkheim, therefore, the religious impulse was no longer expressed, as it had been by Comte, in the formulation of a religion of humanity as a distinct and externalized structure. Durkheim had no religion of humanity as such. He sublimated and depersonalized the manifest religious craving of the Comtian, although he did not eliminate it.

Durkheim thus gave sociology a new, secularized public image. He presented it as a discipline primarily concerned with what is and what has been but not with what ought to be. A "value-free" conception of sociology emerged in Durkheim's work with greater sharpness. In some part this was stimulated by his effort to distinguish sociology from socialism. It was further strengthened by Durkheim's readiness to relinquish in *practice* the earlier, Comtian expectation that sociology could stipulate and legitimate values, even though Durkheim still maintained in *principle* that this would be possible at some future time.

SOCIOLOGY'S INTEGRATION INTO THE UNIVERSITY

This structural change in the sociologist's conception of his discipline and his role during the Classical period was related to sociology's new integration into the growing and renovated university system in Europe. Sociology in the Classical period was no longer the avocation of stigmatized social reformers but the vocation of prestigious academicians. Sociology became a standard full-time career for men who, working in state-sponsored universities, were commonly constrained to accommodate to the claims and sensibilities of theological faculties within the universities as well as to the expectations of state authorities outside of it.

The university itself was, during this period, becoming an agency for the integration of society on a national and secular basis. It contributed to the development of an image of national culture and to a defense of the nation-state as a culture. In this period, then, the growth of technical, intellectual autonomy developed simultaneously with strongly nationalistic identifications by academicians. Academic autonomy comes to be the freedom of each intellectual

specialty to hold its own special intellectual standards within (and tacitly limited by) a larger loyalty to the essential institutions of the social order of the nation. Even as they were making claim to intellectual autonomy, the classical sociologists also were expressing strongly nationalistic sentiments, and in 1914 they enthusiastically supported their nations at war. However strong their claims to intellectual autonomy, the classical academic sociologists rarely manifested autonomy from the claims of the nation-state.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the political sphere's autonomy from religion was widely secure in Western Europe, and the states could thus assume a new *modus vivendi* with the established religions. This secularized autonomy of the state from religious institutions was, in some part, carried forward by the state's mobilization of the university as an independent font of culture and ideology: the university had been coopted by the state. The "autonomy" of the university thus, in part, grew out of the state's need for an ally in developing its autonomy from religious establishments. Paradoxically, the autonomy of the university was and is, in large part, an expression of the support given it and hence of its dependence on the state. Once having established its autonomy from religious establishments, the state wished to consolidate the loyalty of its religious constituency and so did not wish to act provocatively toward religious establishments.

As the university became linked with the state and infused with nationalistic sentiments, it began to be penetrated by the socialist movement of student radicals, on the one hand, and by socialists of "the chair," on the other. The new Academic Sociology, then, became constrained to relate to socialism and Marxism within a university structure that was tied to the state. Academic Sociology therefore launched a scholarly critique of socialism and Marxism, to come to grips with them in intellectual terms. Much of the focus of this discussion, evidenced by Durkheim's lectures on socialism, aimed at distinguishing and separating sociology from socialism. In short, sociology was acting to prevent itself from being "confused" with socialism by the public and the state.

There was thus a growing structural differentiation between Academic Sociology and socialism (as well as religion) in the Classical period, and this, as Irving M. Zeitlin's work elaborates,¹⁹ has had enduring consequences for the scholarly efforts of the classical sociologists. This structural differentiation of sociology and socialism was radically different from their manifest fusion by the Saint-Simonians of the Positivist period. Moreover, in the Classical period, the *de facto* split between sociology and Marxism attained a new level of mutual and polemical self-awareness, with

intellectual and character-defining consequences for Academic Sociology itself.

The earlier emergence of Marxism had produced a sociological synthesis that was strongly critical of established religions and established states and that had defined both of these as mechanisms for maintaining the existing class system. Academic Sociology, however, accommodated itself to the spiritual claims of established religions and to the expectation of loyalty by the nation-state, by renouncing all claims to itself assert ultimate values, whether religious or political. Sociology became "value free," presumably concerned only with what was rather than with what should be and thereby made itself less suspect both to established religions and to the state. Max Weber's explicit manifesto on behalf of a value-free conception of sociology expressly articulated what Durkheim had clearly but only implicitly moved toward. The emerging conception of Academic Sociology as a value-free discipline, along with a tendency to define sociology as an analytically distinct specialization, combined to encourage a politics of academic ecumenism. This promised, in effect, that sociology would tolerate the claims of other interests in and out of the university, in return for their toleration of sociology's now truncated ambitions. In short, Academic Sociology entrenched itself in the university by accommodating itself to the political and religious status quo.

It was out of this accommodation in the Classical period that the modern structure of Academic Sociology arose with its characteristic focus on the existential (that is, what is or had been) and its avoidance of overt, focalized treatment of the normative (that is, what men should do) along with its correspondingly delimited and specialized structure of emerging professional roles. The Positivists of the first period had divided the social world into two orders, the temporal and the spiritual, and had claimed authority in the latter. The Marxists had unmasked the social role of religion, and then chose to seek power directly, in the political sphere. It was left to sociology in the Classical period to renounce influence in both the spiritual and temporal orders. Its tacit slogan became: give unto both Caesar and the priest the things that are theirs.

Despite sociology's increasing integration into and acceptance by modern society in this period, classical sociologists nonetheless had a growing presentiment that there was something deeply wrong with modern industrial societies. It was a feeling shared by both Durkheim and Weber, from whose standpoints the dangerous pathologies were, respectively, anomie and bureaucratization. In France this pessimism was inhibited and repressed by that nation's traditionally more optimistic and rational culture. In Germany,

however, there was a long tradition of pessimism; optimism was widely associated with intellectual superficiality and pessimism with intellectual seriousness: the optimist was rarely judged "deep." Nietzsche's "gay science" was no exception, of course; it allowed optimism only as the grimace of those who could endure the premise of an "eternal recurrence"; it was the desperate "optimism" of the dancer on the grave.

PERIOD IV: PARSONSIAN STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONALISM

The fourth, the modern period in the intellectual synthesis of sociological thought emerged in the late 1930's in the United States. It gathered momentum in the midst of the greatest international economic crisis that capitalism has known. Sociological Positivism was the Academic Sociology that corresponded to pre-Marxian Utopian Socialism. Classical Sociology was the Academic Sociology that corresponded to and confronted the rise of Marxism, socialism, and their subsequent development of revisionism and reformism. Parsonian Structural-Functionalism corresponds to the period of the communist seizure of state power in Russia and to the subsequent intellectual stasis of Marxism that accompanied the rise of Stalinism. It is rooted in a time when Marxism has achieved state sponsorship and when socialism has come to power in a vast Eurasian land.

STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONALISM AS A SYNTHESIS OF FRENCH FUNCTIONALISM AND GERMAN ROMANTICISM

Parsons' work began by syncretizing the "spiritual" component of German Romanticism, which focused on the inward orientation of the actor, with the French tradition of Functional theory; however, it was the Romantic component that Parsons first stressed by characterizing his earliest synthesis as "voluntarist." Parsons' theory thus contained two historically and culturally distinct attitudes that coexist in a tensionful relationship. There was French revisionist social utilitarianism, in which social arrangements are explained in terms of their imputed usefulness for or function in the larger group or society, which is seen as a "system" of interacting elements. Also there was the Romantic importance attributed to moral or value elements, where behavior is accounted for by

efforts to conform with an internalized moral code and where, it is emphasized, men need pay no heed to consequences but seek to conform to the code for its own sake. Parsons' combination of Functionalism and voluntarism was a reflection, within the idiom of technical social theory, of the continuing conflict in bourgeois culture between utility and morality or "natural rights," and it was an effort to confront and resolve this cultural conflict on the theoretical level.

Parsons added a distinctively American emphasis to the tradition of German Romanticism. This Romanticism had stressed the "inward" significance of ideals that were seen as shaping the private life of the mind within which—in contrast to the public and political spheres—it was felt that true freedom resided. Since Parsons came to German Romanticism largely through Max Weber, who had stressed the *worldly* consequences of certain ideals, he was alerted to the role of ideas as stimulants to outward or public action, striving, and achievement. Parsons went beyond Weber, moving toward a still more Americanized version of Romanticism, by stressing the melioristic potential in the *successful* acting out of one's values. Parsons thus rejected the pessimism that had long tinged German Romanticism and whose gloom had deepened in the post-Bismarckian and post-Schopenhauerian period; he crystallized a more optimistic and more activist formulation of sociological Romanticism. In short, Parsons Americanized German sociological Romanticism.

Following World War II there was a tendency in American sociology to return to a more *social* utilitarianism, both in Parsons' own work and in Functional theory more generally. Parsons' later work, especially *The Social System* (1951), placed a relatively great stress on the importance of the gratifying outcome of individual conformity with values, and on the contributions of diverse social structures or processes to the integration of social systems. His concern for the usefulness of certain social or cultural arrangements for system equilibrium became focal while his earlier stress on the energizing character of values became subsidiary.

About the same time, Robert K. Merton's version of Functionalism also manifested a tendency to restore social utilitarianism. Merton treated the subjective orientations of persons (the voluntaristic component) in a completely "secularized" manner; viewing them as just one among many analytic considerations and devoid of any special pathos, he explicitly took the functional consequences of various social patterns as his point of departure. This return to a revisionist social utilitarianism in postwar American sociology was then largely completed in George Homans' theory rooted in a mercantile metaphor of "exchange." Homans focused

on the individual gratifications "exchange" provided, and he treated moral values as themselves emergents of ongoing exchanges. Here Romanticism received its *coup de grâce* from a Spencerian Positivism allied with Skinnerian Behaviorism and American "tough-mindedness." It is the most unabashedly individualistic utilitarianism in modern sociology. The wave of theorizing that had begun as a form of *anti-utilitarianism* in the United States during the late 1930's thus relapsed into social and even individualistic utilitarianism following World War II.

Still there is no doubt that so far as Parsons' own work is concerned, moral values are always viewed with a special pathos and are always attributed a special importance. He continues to stress moral values, although moving from a more Weberian view that emphasizes their role as energizers of action to a more Durkheimian view that emphasizes their role as sources of social order. Parsons never allows moral values to become just one other variable in the social equation. Paradoxically, however, neither does he ever mount a full-scale and systematic exploration of the nature and functioning of moral values. But this is not peculiar to him.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF MORALS: A STRUCTURAL LACUNA IN SOCIOLOGY

The internal structure of sociology may be usefully characterized in terms of what it does *not* do and in terms of what it excludes. In addition to sociology's systematic neglect of economic factors, there is another generally evident intellectual omission from the internal structure of academic sociological practice: this is the absence of a *sociology of morals or values*. Despite the fact that Academic Sociology, beginning with Sociological Positivism, had hailed the significance of shared moral values, despite the fact that Emile Durkheim had called for and promised to create such a sociology of morals, and despite the fact that a concern with moral values was central to Max Weber's sociology of religion as well as to Talcott Parsons' "voluntaristic" theory, there still remains no concentration of scholarship that might be called a "sociology of moral values" and would correspond in cumulative development to specialized areas, such as the study of social stratification, role analysis, political sociology, let alone to criminology or to family studies.

This omission is paradoxical because the concerns of Academic Sociology, seen as a patterned arrangement of scholarly energies and attention, have traditionally emphasized the importance of moral values both for the solidarity of societies and for the well-being of individuals. Structurally, then, Academic Sociology is

characterized both by the importance it attributes to values and by its failure to develop—in its characteristic manner which transforms almost everything into a specialization—a distinctive sociology of moral values. This omission is, I believe, due largely to the fact that a full-scale analysis of moral values would tend to undermine their autonomy. Both sides of this paradoxical structure of sociology, however, constitute important problems that can be most fully understood in Talcott Parsons' social theory; I therefore propose to defer further discussion of it until I can address myself to Parsons' work in some detail.

STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONALISM IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION

The anti-utilitarianism of Parsons' prewar theory must be related to its historical context in the Great Depression, while its postwar drift back toward social utilitarianism must be seen in its own, different historical milieu. As I shall later show more fully, Parsons' early anti-utilitarian or "voluntaristic" theory was, in part, a response to the social conflicts and demoralization born of the Great Depression. Its stress on the importance of moral ideals was a call to hold fast to those traditional values that called for individual striving in the face of crisis-induced instigation to change or reject them.

In the 1930's the economic system had broken down. It could no longer produce the massive daily gratifications that helped to hold middle-class society together and foster commitment to its values. If the society was to be held together and its cultural patterns maintained—as Parsons clearly wished—one was constrained to look for noneconomic sources of social integration. In the time-worn manner of the conservative, Parsons looked to individual moral commitment to cement society. Parsons' voluntaristic sociology did not consider the crisis soluble in terms of the New Deal's welfare efforts, so, in effect, it concerned itself with what was necessary to integrate the society *despite* mass deprivation. Parsons expected that morality might cement the society without changes in economic institutions and without redistributions of income and power that might threaten established privileges. In short, Parsons' theory was not congenial—and was, indeed, hostile—to the emerging Welfare State.

Then, of course, came the war. Unlike the period of the Great Depression the state could then act in the name of an all-embracing national unity. It could and did call upon sociologists to use their technical skills on behalf of the collectivity; many sociologists

began to be employed by the federal bureaucracy. American sociologists acquired a firsthand and gratifying experience with the power, prestige, and resources of the state apparatus. From that time forward, their relationship with the state was a closer one.

During the war and after it, prosperity returned, at least for the middle class; American society was reknit by affluence and by war-induced solidarity. The working class and its unions became increasingly integrated into the society; the sense of an imminent threat to public order disappeared. Yet many retained a sense of the precariousness of the system that even the new affluence could not completely dissipate; the cleavages of the Great Depression had been repaired but not forgotten. Moreover, New Deal legislation had created new expectations and vested interests among middle-class professionals as well as among the working class, which had acquired a glimpse of what the state might do for them. The Welfare State was, in short, here to stay. Following the war it gradually became involved with problems of racial inequities.

With the return of affluence and a growing Welfare State, the maintenance of social order in postwar America no longer needed to rely so exclusively upon moral incentives. Furthermore, in the postwar affluence the more fluid "collective" behavior of the depression receded, and there was less of an intensive street life and on-the-road existence. Social life ebbed back into more clearly defined structures (buildings, offices, and factories) and into more traditional styles of politics: the daily rhythms of social life once again became routine. To see society in terms of firm, clearly defined structures, as Parsons' new theory did, was now not dissonant with the collective experience, the shared personal reality, of daily life. The new structural vision of Parsons' work, like a leaning tower built of concept piled on concept, corresponded to a period of social recoalence that retained an abiding, though latent sense of the powerful potentialities of disorder. The Great Depression had glaringly revealed the possibilities of social catastrophe. But with success in war and the return of affluence, Parsons' confidence in the society seemed vindicated, and he mobilized himself for the Herculean labor of tidying up the residual social debris. Driven toward an all-inclusive comprehensiveness by an impulse to fill in all the empty spaces, he began to seek a conceptual place for everything in society and to put everything in some conceptualized place; it was search for intellectual order that manifests a certain frenetic character.

The second phase of Parsons' work parallels the accelerated consolidation of the Welfare State. In this period his emphasis is initially placed on society as a *social system* composed of interacting institutions and other components. In the first, prewar period

his emphasis had been on the role of values, particularly on the energizing role of values: the voluntaristic dimension. Despite his involvement in Harvard's Paretian circle during the 1930's, Parsons' conception of society *qua* system had then only been sketched. It was in the postwar period, however, that it was first fully elaborated and seen as a self-maintaining, homeostatic system. Later on, and by the 1960's, this "system" focus gradually comes into conflict with emphases that call for political priorities which assign powerful initiatives to the state. Moreover, in his second period Parsons also elaborated the complex variety of specific mechanisms that contribute directly to the internal stability of a society, which goes well beyond the mere affirmation of the importance of shared values as a source of societal stability.

In the prewar period, then, Parsons had focused on moral values as inward stimuli to social action, as energizers of individual effort. In a way, this early period had focused on the importance of maintaining the sheer vitality of the system; it was above all a fight against the entropy of cultural patterns and against the waning of individual loyalty to them; the fundamental support for cultural patterns was seen to reside in the inward moral convictions of individuals.

In the second period, however, the security of the social system was now seen as more dependent upon its *own* special devices, upon the operation of various, autonomous mechanisms of system integration and accommodation, and less on the will, drive, or commitment of persons. Moving from a focus upon individuals, Parsons now was concerned with how the social system *as such* maintains its *own* coherence, fits individuals into its mechanisms and institutions, arranges and socializes them to provide what the system requires. Moral conviction and inwardness of commitment are now seen as system-derived and produced; the focus is no longer on what moral conviction produces but rather on how it is produced by the socializing mechanisms of the system. Thus the reliance on largely moral incentives as the mainspring of social solidarity is reduced in the postwar period, when there is renewed affluence and when, in consequence, other inducements to conformity and social solidarity have been refurbished. An emphasis on voluntaristic individual commitment is supplanted by a reliance on the "socialization" of individuals to produce the choices the system requires.

In the postwar period Parsons saw system-equilibrium as a derivative of system initiatives and processes, as resting essentially on the conformity that all give to the legitimate expectations of each other. This was a vision of societal solidarity that fit in with the Welfare State's practical interest in finding ways to produce

loyalty and conformity and with its operating assumption that the stability of society is strengthened by conforming with the "legitimate" expectations of deprived social strata which, in turn, are then expected to have a willing conformity with conventional morality. The operating assumption is that deprived strata will be "grateful" for the aid they are given—rather than assuming, as Durkheim had, that men are inherently insatiable—and that they will therefore conform willingly to the expectations of the giver. In some respects, then, the postwar phase of Parsonsianism was rather consistent with the requirements and assumptions of a Welfare State. As I shall indicate later, however, there were important ways in which Parsonsianism remained a *pre-Keynesian* sociology, still moored in an earlier image of a social order held together by *spontaneous* processes, and thus by no means fully corresponded to the Welfare State's instrumental interest in social order or, for that matter, with its other disposition toward justice and equality.

THE GENERAL CRISIS OF MIDDLE-CLASS SOCIETY AND PARSONSIANISM

The Parsonsian synthesis grew out of the deep crisis in middle-class societies, which had historically been developing well before the Great Depression. This crisis was pervasive, general, and acute; it was economic and political; it was domestic and international. Prior to the Parsonsian synthesis, the crisis had unfolded itself in four major convulsions, each with world-wide ramification:

(1) World War I, which undermined the middle class's confidence in the inevitability of progress, destroyed old nation-states and created new ones throughout Europe, increased American influence in Europe, undermined mass confidence in the old elites, and set the stage for (2) the Soviet Revolution, which for a period, intensified the revolutionary potential in Western and Central Europe, acutely heightened anxieties among the Euro-American middle class, began to polarize international tensions around the United States and the Soviet Union, and, converging with growing nationalism in underdeveloped areas and particularly in Asia, undermined the colonial empires of the victorious Western powers; (3) the Rise of Fascism in Italy and especially of Nazism in Germany, which signaled that the European middle class's anxieties had become a panic that undermined social and political stability throughout the continent; (4) the international economic crisis of the 1930's, which, overlapping with the third wave, created mass unemployment among the working class, acute deprivation to small farmers, sharp status anxieties and economic threats to the middle

class, and finally accelerated the growth of the Welfare State in the United States. With the United States' involvement in the world economic crisis, the international stronghold of the world middle class had been breached.

Parsonsonianism does not simply emerge at this specific time, but it emerges also in a specific place, Harvard University. Its emergence there tokened a regional and cultural shift in the center of gravity of Academic Sociology in the United States. Sociology now developed in, and was influenced by, the culture of the Eastern Seaboard rather than that of the American Midwest, in which it had previously developed at Chicago University. Eastern Seaboard culture tends to be somewhat less localistic, parochial, isolationist, and less "down to earth"; it is, correspondingly, more "intellectualistic," more national, and more international in its orientations. In particular, Eastern Seaboard culture has a greater sensitivity to happenings in Europe.

Parsonsonianism, in fine, developed in an era when the anxieties of the middle class in different nations came to be shared; these anxieties were focused on a common international danger, the emergence of Communist power in the Soviet Union, as well as on a common international economic crisis, the Great Depression of the 1930's. If the Classical period of sociological synthesis reflected a set of parallel tensions that were viewed by the middle class in terms of national particularities, the Parsonsonian era reflected a general, Euro-American crisis of the *international* middle class. It reflected the common concerns of relatively advanced or "developed" industrial societies whose elites defined their problem primarily in terms of their common need to maintain "social order."

Social theory could not be relevant to this world crisis if it were formulated solely in terms of (1) social problems in individual institutional sectors, each treated in isolation from the other, or in terms of (2) a monographic historiography that focused scholarship on the special traditions of different nations, their unique types of culture, or their varying levels of industrialization. If social theory was to be relevant to the common problems of such diverse societies, it had to take the problem of social order as central, and it had to be constructed in a relatively abstract manner. The empirical emptiness and abstractness of the Parsonsonian analysis of social order reflected an effort to respond to the existence of an international crisis that simultaneously threatened the middle class in capitalist countries on different levels of industrialization and with different political traditions. Despite their many other differences, European societies could then be seen as facing a similar problem, the problem of order, and as having certain crucial likenesses rather than as differentiated national societies: they could more

readily be seen, in short, as "cases" in an abstract "social system."

Any sociological synthesis that aimed at being relevant to any one of these societies also had to be applicable to the others. The thrust of sociological synthesis was thus pushed to the highest and most abstract level of generalization. The resultant paradox: the more the theoretical synthesis probed toward the true generality of the existing crisis and was capable of coping with international variety, the more irrelevant it seemed to the crisis as it was experienced in any of the nations involved. This was a central paradox of Parsonianism.

This paradox has led to a vast misunderstanding of Parsons' work, one which is particularly common in the interpretations of it by liberal sociologists. These critics frequently assert that Parsons' theory lacks concern for problems of contemporary relevance, meaning, I suppose, that it does not directly focus on social problems manifest in the everyday world: for example, poverty, race, war, economic development or underdevelopment. There is a sense in which this criticism is true; but there is a more important sense in which it misses the point. For, the insistence with which Parsons focused on the problem of "social order," most generally conceived, implied that he, rather than his liberal critics, had in fact glimpsed the true extent of the modern crisis; at least he saw it in its full depth, even though defining it from a singularly conservative perspective, as a problem of the maintenance of order.

Parsons' liberal critics reveal their own limitations when they fail to see that there *are* historical eras when the crisis of social order is general and manifest. The depression of the 1930's, which existed when Parsons was writing *The Structure of Social Action*, was such an era. It was a time of mass meetings, marches, demonstrations, shotgun auctions, protests, petitions, welfare demands, militant organizations, street corner meetings, and riots: it was a time of widespread collective unrest. From the conservative standpoint such a period is viewed as an acute threat to social order; from a radical standpoint, however, the time may be seen as one of revolutionary opportunity. The problem of social order, then, is the conservative's way of talking about the conditions when an established elite is unable to rule in traditional ways and when there is a crisis of the master institutions.

However conservative his formulation, Parsons was absolutely correct in insisting that the problem of social order in our time is not merely an academic problem but one of abiding and contemporary relevance. Parsons had seen more deeply into the precariousness of modern society than most of his critics. Unlike some of his critics who, as liberal technologists, view "problems

of contemporary relevance" as capable of being resolved if only enough money and expertise are mobilized, Parsons' vision of the contemporary social condition saw that it embodied a more total and general problem that would not be so easily engineered away.

Parsons' shortcoming, therefore, was not that he failed to engage problems of contemporary relevance but that he continued to view them from the standpoint of an American optimism. Because he saw them from this optimistic standpoint, he one-sidedly emphasized the adaptability of the status quo, considering the ways in which it was open to change rather than the manner in which its own characteristics were inducing the disorder and resisting adaptation to it. But for all his optimism, Parsons—unlike his liberal critics—had glimpsed the true depth of the contemporary problem. His abiding optimism, however, led him to believe that the present institutions were viable, that the status quo had not been played out but still had time and resources commensurate to the crisis. Parsons' confidence in the status quo was also buoyed by his sense of the vulnerability of its critics and their alternatives: if things were bad here, they were not manifestly better elsewhere. Parsons' optimism led him to no facile solutions, and he never viewed the agony of his culture, in the manner of liberal technologists, as an occasion to vaunt a brittle technical expertise.

But there is a paradox here that must be faced: How was it that Parsons could remain an optimist, although he had seen so deeply into the contemporary crisis? It is not enough to invoke general American conditions and the prevalence of optimism in American culture. We must also examine the concrete manner in which history and culture intersect with individual biography. In short, we must come closer to the individuated way in which culture becomes embedded in personal reality and influences theory.

The vital statistic here is that Parsons was born in 1902. This means, first, that he did not experience World War I as an adult, being only twelve when it began and only fifteen when the United States entered it. Second, this means that Parsons was a mature man of twenty-seven when the stock market crash of 1929 heralded the coming of the Great Depression. Parsons had, in short, grown to manhood during the booming economic prosperity in the United States of the 1920's. His education had been completed (A.B., Amherst, and Ph.D., Heidelberg) two years before the economic crisis started. By 1929 Parsons had been married and on the faculty of Harvard for two years.

In other words: some of the most fundamental aspects of Parsons' personal reality had been shaped by the economic prosperity of the 1920's, during which time his own personal prospects and position coincided with the general success of the American

economy. It was thus not simply that Parsons had witnessed the "success" of the American economy as an outsider, but that as an Instructor at Harvard and as the son of a college president he also participated in it. Much of Parsons' abiding optimism, I would suggest, is rooted in the fact that he viewed the Great Depression from a specific perspective: from the standpoint of a personal reality that had been formed by the experience of success. Parsons encountered the Great Depression as an adult who had already started a career at America's most prominent university. By 1929 Parsons was by no means professionally prominent; yet he was about as successful as a young academician born in Colorado Springs, Colorado, might expect to be.

Seen in the light of the prosperity of the 1920's, the Great Depression seemed to many like a bad dream, frightening but unreal, which in time would go away. With the advent of World War II, it did. For Parsons, then, the Great Depression was an interlude between the prosperity of the 1920's and the later American triumph in World War II and postwar affluence. Linked to the experiences of a powerful and successful middle class, Parsons' optimism was the optimism of those for whom success, of and in the system, was the fundamental personal reality and for whom its failure was an aberration not quite personally real.

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF ACADEMIC SOCIOLOGY

The great thinkers of the Classical period were not only politically but also culturally nationalist in experience and orientation; indeed, even their own social theories were often developed in ignorance of relevant work in other countries. The ignorance Weber and Durkheim had of each other's work is the most notable case in point. Parsons, however, began the assimilation of the hitherto nationally fragmented expressions of European social theory. This entailed a synthesis of Western European social theory within the framework of an American structure of sentiments, assumptions, and personal reality. Parsons did not simply reproduce or transplant European theory into American culture like an emigré; he profoundly destructured, assimilated, and resynthesized it in terms of the different American experience. His synthesis became viable in American academic life while remaining relevant to European culture. It could thus serve as a bridge between European and American intellectual life and as a major step in the internationalization of Academic Sociology.

There is little question but that the crisis of the 1930's intensified American academic interest in European social theory and

brought it to the center of intellectual controversy. In particular, the crisis of the 1930's led some American academicians to look to European Academic Sociology as a defense against the Marxism that was recently penetrating American campuses, for Europeans had far longer experience with it. European social theory was thrown into the breach against the crisis-generated interest in Marxism. It was with such ideologically shaped expectations that a group of Harvard scholars, which centered on L. J. Henderson and included Parsons, George Homans, and Crane Brinton, formed a seminar on Vilfredo Pareto, which began to meet in the fall of 1932 and met regularly until 1934.²⁰ Also attending were R. K. Merton, Henry Murray, and Clyde Kluckhohn.

The political implications of the circle's interest in Pareto were expressed by George Homans, who candidly acknowledged—Mr. Homans never says anything except with forceful candor—that “as a Republican Bostonian who had not rejected his comparatively wealthy family, I felt during the thirties that I was under personal attack, above all from the Marxists. I was ready to believe Pareto because he provided me with a defense.”²¹ The *nature* of this defense may, in part, be glimpsed in Homans' 1936 article, “The Making of a Communist,” where he argued that a “society is an organism and . . . like all organisms, if a threat be made to its mode of existence, a society will produce antibodies which tend to restore it to its original form.”²² Here, then, was their rationale for optimism and conservatism even in the midst of the great crisis.

The location of the Pareto circle in the political spectrum was clearly indicated by Crane Brinton, who remarked that “at Harvard in the thirties there was certainly, led by Henderson, what the Communists or fellow-travellers or even just mild American-style liberals in the University used to call ‘the Pareto cult.’” Pareto himself was then called, as Brinton notes, “The Marx of the Bourgeoisie” when he was not, somewhat less grandly, simply termed a fascist. In short, the Pareto circle took a political position far over on the conservative right, placing itself in opposition not simply to Communists but also to “mild American-style liberals.” The internationalization of American Academic Sociology thus began on a politically conservative, anti-Marxist basis. The Pareto circle was clearly searching for a theoretical defense against Marxism, and this aspect of their attraction to Pareto was by no means thrust back into the dimmer regions of subsidiary awareness.

Being a member neither of Harvard's Society of Fellows nor of Boston's exclusive Saturday Club—Henderson and Brinton belonged to both, Homans only to the Society—Parsons seems to have been not quite nuclear to the circle, although he was very close to Henderson. His own anti-Marxist position was therefore

somewhat different from—less parochial and earlier than—that of the other members of the seminar. Indeed, Parsons had already been familiarized with the European critics of Marxism, particularly Max Weber, during his European studies, which were prior to the depression and to his membership in the Pareto circle. In short, Parsons had his theoretical ammunition in hand before the target came into view on the American scene.

Yet, despite the political and ideological motives that animated American interests in anti-Marxist European theorists, there were important ways in which the Americans' relation to this European tradition remained an external one. While Parsons and others were fully alert to the ideological significance of this European critique, they assimilated it from the standpoint of an American culture in which the socialist tradition and experience were, despite the current upsurge, still little known at first hand. The specific intellectual issues, the changing political conflicts and historical paradigms, on which the European response to socialism rested, were not really a part of the cultural and personal reality of American sociologists. The Marxism they knew was largely known as theory and not as a familiar political expression or embodiment.

Political and intellectual traditions in the United States had not fastened academic attention on the challenge of Marxism as compulsively as it had in Europe. The American theoretical response to the crisis was therefore not impelled to remain locked in a close confrontation with Marxism that would narrowly limit the terms of its rejoinder; and the Americans could use the full variety of the intellectual weapons that had been stored in the European armory. Parsons, therefore, never engaged himself as directly and deeply with Marxism as had the Europeans. He never really came to a conception of its full analytic complexity and, indeed, had committed himself to a view on Marxism before he had any sensitivity to its own internal development. There is little doubt that Parsons has always had a better acquaintance with Marx's critics than with Marx himself. In the 793 pages of his *Structure of Social Action*, Parsons makes not a single reference to the original writings of Marx or Engels, citing only secondary sources. Seeing Marxism primarily as an obsolescent intellectual system rather than as a living culture, as akin more to Hobbes, Locke, or Malthus than to Durkheim, Parsons took his approach to Marxism from the conclusions but not the experience of Weber, Durkheim, Pareto, and Sombart. For these scholars Marxism had been a living culture, and their struggle against it was embedded in their own personal reality. For Parsons, however, Marxism was primarily a cultural record, a thing of books that was never built deeply into his personal reality. Not bound to a tradition of detailed Marxist criticism, the Parsonian

synthesis could be formulated in more abstract terms. Parsons could start with the conclusions of the classical European critique of Marxism and, picking up where these had stopped, could move on to a more general theory rather than pursuing narrow, detailed, historical study in the European manner.

POSITIVISM AND PARSONS: FROM SCIENTISM TO PROFESSIONALISM

At the beginning of this chapter I briefly described the historical conditions surrounding the emergence of sociological Positivism, with a view to understanding certain of the social forces that helped shape it. The restoration context of Positivism may also help to provide some historical perspective on the social conditions that led Talcott Parsons—perhaps more than any other social theorist since Comte—to undertake the formulation of a comprehensive Grand Theory. An understanding of this may be illuminated by noting certain of the important similarities between the periods in which each worked. The most important of these, in my view, is that there was in each period a sharp conflict, a conflict that did not simply involve relatively limited questions about a few issues, but entailed a confrontation between two sharply different and comprehensive mappings of the social order as a whole. In the 1930's one mapping was the traditional free-enterprise image of the middle class in the United States and the other was that offered, first, by Marxism and, second, by the New Deal.

In the America of the 1930's, Marxism was a perspective attractive to only a minority, though it was generally an articulate and energetic minority of intellectuals whose views were clearly visible, within the universities and elsewhere. In this the middle-class map of society was challenged in a most comprehensive manner, and, even though American Marxists were not themselves politically powerful in the United States, they were often associated with a powerful political embodiment of Marxism, the Soviet Union. On a different level, however, the conventional middle-class map was also challenged by the extensive New Deal reforms. While these constituted a far less radical challenge than that presented by Marxism, they were frightening because they were politically powerful, a governmentally sponsored alternative. The extensive changes in welfare arrangements, employment practices, labor relations, and in industrial and banking organization that were proposed or enacted by the New Deal were often far more threatening to parts of the middle class than even the actual economic breakdown itself. In certain middle-class quarters hatred of "that man" Roosevelt sometimes attained paranoiac proportions, even

though the point of New Deal reforms was to stabilize the established system in its essentials rather than overturn it. The abruptness of the acceleration toward a Welfare State had made some feel that "society as they knew it" was under radical attack.

Although Marxism and the New Deal represented very different alternatives to traditional social mappings, anxieties about each resonated and amplified anxieties about the other. Anxiety about communism led sectors of the middle class to view the New Deal as more radical than it was, while anxiety about the New Deal led them to view communism as more powerful than it was in the United States. As some viewed it, the New Deal was merely a disguise and opening wedge for international communism. Fused as the two sometimes seemed, traditional middle-class mappings of society thus often seemed to be under attack by an alternative that was both radical and powerful. Thus the real conflict between alternative social maps, which was in fact sharper than it had been in the United States since the Civil War, came to be seen in some quarters as even more acute than it was. The question of the basic character of the social order in its totality often became a matter of extensive public concern and of articulate and visible debate among many intellectuals. The stability and legitimacy of the traditional social order in the United States of the 1930's was no longer taken for granted in anything like the manner that it had previously been.

It is in this respect that there was important structural similarity between Restoration society and American society during the 1930's; in each case the situation was conducive to an effort to provide a comprehensive new mapping of the social order, to clarify its essential elements, to estimate its resources for progress and its prospects for recovery, and to define the sources and conditions of its legitimacy.

Faced with an international and domestic crisis of the most acute sort, for the solution of which their services were not at first sought by public authorities, Parsons and his students began their long march into the inner resources of theory. The crisis of the 1930's gave them few career inducements and little research funding that might have stimulated them to engage themselves with it directly and have diverted them from theory building. There were few opportunities for Parsons and his students to engage in "social engineering" as sociologists, even had they felt this feasible and desirable. As it was, however, Parsons' ideological and theoretical bent—conservative in politics and *laissez faire* in its Paretian implications—did not lead them to believe that such intervention was needed or desirable. Those of more liberal persuasion might and did engage themselves as professionals in governmental

service; but, what *could* have been done by academic conservatives who rejected the New Deal, and how *could* they have formulated their work to enhance its practical relevance to the problems of the time?

In some part, then, the Parsonsian withdrawal into technical theory was an expression of the impotence of a conservative outlook during this American crisis. The technical involution of Parsonsian theory was contingent on the lack of external opportunity that might have attracted it to social engineering as well as on its own ideological character and commitments.

But the point here is not the specific ideological character of Parsonsianism, that is, its conservatism; the more important point is that the political impotence of *any* ideological position may become an inducement to compensatory theoretical effort. It is partly, but not simply, that men engaged in active politics usually have little time for extended theorizing. The other fundamental point is that self-involved and technically-engrossed theorizing is an activity that for some intellectuals, whatever their ideology, is *self-sustaining* when the time is out of joint for their political ideologies, be it too late or too early, and when they need to compensate for failure, defeat, or neglect. It is the politically defeated or the historically checkmated who write intensive, technically complex social theory. Such Grand Social Theory is thus, in part, a substitute for politics.

Plato, for example, makes this plain in his seventh Epistle, where he explicitly indicates that he turned to philosophy after his expectations of a political career were disappointed and when neither the oligarchy nor the democracy in Athens satisfied him. Again, the first period of the Positivist sociological synthesis is partly rooted, as I have indicated, in the work of a declassed nobility, the Counts DeBonald, de Maistre, and Saint-Simon, and in the efforts of a nascent technical intelligentsia which was literally disenfranchised. Again, as revealed in the letters he wrote to Saint-Simon in breaking off their relationship, Comte wanted to retreat to a "pure" sociology, feeling that practical men of affairs in his society did not have the wit to understand sociology nor the inclination to honor the sociologist. It is also notable that the most technically involved period of Karl Marx's own productivity largely followed the failure of the Revolution of 1848. And the failure of Max Weber's own political ambitions—culminating in but not limited by his inability to secure nomination for political office—is well known. In all four major periods of sociological development, then, extended and technically-engrossed social theorizing—and perhaps, particularly, systematic, "grand" theorizing—has taken one of its motivations from political frustration and powerlessness.

Sociological Positivism of the early nineteenth century had defined the modern society that was then emerging as "industrial"; they had seen it as the culminating stage in an historical evolution which would be perfected gradually. They believed, on the one hand, that there were archaic social arrangements centering on the elites of the old regime, that needed to be superseded and, on the other, that there were lacunae in the modern arrangements that needed to be filled in. They believed that the new society needed to be integrated or as they repeatedly put it, "organized," and that this required a new moral code appropriate to the emerging industrial, technological, and scientific institutions of the new order. Their central emphasis, however, was on the importance of *science*: partly as an instrument for enhancing productivity and thereby reducing dangerous mass discontent; partly as a method through which men could be persuaded to a consensus in beliefs that could integrate the new society; and partly as a commitment, which, unlike sheer wealth, could lend *legitimacy* to the new industrial institutions and the new men of property who controlled them. Science, for the Positivists, was to be the central source of modern social integration and of the legitimacy of its new elites.

The Parsonian response to the crisis of the 1930's differed by reason of the different position of the American middle class, the difference in the threats with which it had to contend, and the differences in the bases of its legitimacy and, in particular, in the role of science as a base of legitimation. In the United States of the 1930's science and technology were, of course, deeply entrenched commonplaces of daily life. Yet, while deeply entrenched, they were not altogether unproblematic, for in consequence of the depression they had lost in public credit; in fact, some people then held that the depression itself was attributable to the overproduction caused by a too rapid technological development. Indeed, there was even talk of declaring a moratorium on scientific and technological development. In short, science was being seen as a source of trouble. The American middle class's association with science was therefore by no means sufficient to establish its legitimacy.

Moreover, the abrupt and devastating collapse of the American economy in the 1930's had sharply undermined the legitimacy of the reigning American elite; the gap visible between power and morality in public life was thus dangerously wide. And from Parsons' morality-sensitive perspective, it was precisely this impairment of the middle class's legitimacy that was one of the primary problems. He thus set out in the midst of the Great Depression to mend the rift between power and morality and to find new bases of legitimacy for the American elite.

It is in the conclusions of these efforts that one can see some

of the important differences between Parsons and the Positivists. Parsons placed considerably less emphasis on science as a source for elite legitimation and social integration; instead he gave a new emphasis to "professionalism." In his 1938 paper on the professions, he noted that all of the elites of industrial society, businessmen no less than scientists, were now regarded as forming "professions." Indeed, modern society as a whole, he said, was distinguished by the importance of the professions, "which is, in any comparable degree of development, unique in history."²³ Here Parsons had found a way of characterizing modern society without defining it, as Marx had, as "capitalist" and, at the same time, without having to stress its bureaucratic character, as had Weber. It was a "professional society," orderly yet "spiritual"; it was neither bureaucratic nor capitalist.

There seems little question that Parsons' focus on the professions was stimulated by his polemical effort to refute the depression-intensified conception of modern society that had focused on its capitalist character. "If asked what were the most distinctive features [of Western civilization], relatively few social scientists would mention the professions at all. Probably the majority would unhesitatingly refer to the modern economic order, to 'capitalism,' 'free enterprise,' the 'business economy,' or however else it is denominated."²⁴ For Parsons the focus on the professions was an opportunity to diminish the significance then commonly attributed to the "capitalistic" or "profit-making" aspect of modern society.²⁵

The emphasis in Parsons' analysis of the professions is on their similarity to business, on the elements common to both. Hitherto, says Parsons, the common view has had it that the businessman egoistically pursued his own self-interest while the professional altruistically served others. Not so, he says. Business and the professions do not pursue essentially different motives; the difference between them, says Parsons, is "one of the different situations in which the same commonly human motives operate . . . the acquisitiveness of modern business is institutional rather than motivational."²⁶ Both businessmen and professionals seek "success" and recognition of their success, even though the manner in which success is concretely defined and pursued may differ in each case. Thus professionals are not "altruistic" in the conventional sense, while businessmen are not "egoistic"; both are simply conforming to the standards deemed appropriate in their special areas of activity. Moreover, businessmen and professionals are also alike in their rationality, seeking the most efficient rather than traditional ways of carrying on work; the authority of both is also characterized by their functional specificity, each being an authority only in his own delimited areas; and both are universalistic, governing

their decisions by certain general and impersonal rules. Parsons' emphasis, then, is on the characteristics *common* to the professions and business, thus diminishing the significance attributed to the self-interested pursuit of private gain. Parsons thereby envisions businessmen as professionals. To the charge that the professions have become commercialized, he counters by saying it is rather commerce that has become professionalized. Assimilated to the professions, business becomes credited with the moral responsibility traditionally imputed to the professions for collective welfare and thus is legitimated.

Seen as a profession, business comes to be defined as the moral exercise of competence on behalf of the public interest in "productivity." The shift from Positivism to Parsonsianism, then, entails a shift from science to professionalism as the source of elite legitimation; the rational and empirical components of science are not eliminated but are, rather, fused with a moral component, professionalization. There were thus at least two important ways in which Parsons sought to repair the modern split between power and morality and to mend the Positivistic rift between the spiritual and temporal orders; first, by a refocusing that moved the locus of legitimation from science to the professions and, second, as I have earlier emphasized in discussing Parsons' "voluntarism," by a stress on the autonomy and *causal potency* of moral values in determining social outcomes.

At the same time, Parsons also insisted that even the pre-professional captains of industry were not to be understood as having been primarily motivated by expedient or self-interested considerations, for they were always under the heavy influence of essentially moral values, particularly, of the Protestant Ethic or its later, more secularized versions. In short, businessmen were seen as motivated neither as American Populists had viewed them, by greed and venality, nor as the Marxists had, by the structural constraints of the capitalist system; businessmen and business were seen as motivated by moral orientations that were becoming increasingly institutionalized through professionalization. Such a defense of the legitimacy of business, one might add, was more likely to be persuasive to those whose personal reality derived from experience with the older, better-educated, New England business elites, than to those acquainted with the "hog-butchers" of the Midwest.

Another evident difference between Positivism and Parsonsianism is that the former was emphatically evolutionary in outlook, while the latter is nonevolutionary or only marginally evolutionary. That Parsons has lately produced an essay on "evolutionary universals" does no more than suggest that this is of some subsidiary

concern to him. But evolutionism was crucial and not peripheral to the Positivists. This difference seems to be related to the fact that, unlike the Positivists, the middle class of Parsons' society was not threatened by an *old* elite which was identified with and drew attention to the past, and thus did not need to look forward to a future in which it would be rid of that incubus. The forces threatening the modern middle class are themselves very future-oriented and look forward to a radically different society. Parsonsian Functionalism, therefore, is grounded in a class experience that has no stimulus to focus upon the past and little desire that its future be radically different. Its impulses are fundamentally conservative: they want more, but more of the *same*. It is thus not seriously evolutionary but, rather, synchronic in its primary emphasis; its concern is with social order, that is, integration. This is particularly reflected in Parsons' later post-World-War-II phase, where he moves from his earlier stress on Weber's interests to those of Durkheim's. Speaking of an article by Kenneth Boulding, Parsons remarks that: "I, for one . . . would endorse what he [Boulding] refers to as a 'strong temptation' to identify sociology with concern about the integrative system."²⁷

THE BEGINNING OF A NEW PERIOD: EMERGING TRENDS

MARXISM AND ACADEMIC SOCIOLOGY: SCHISM AND GROWING POLYCENTRISM

Seen from a world perspective, the schism between Academic Sociology and Marxism remains one of the central features of the historical structure of Western Sociology even into the present, the fourth period, which is now ending. Following the Bolshevik Revolution, the subsequent world development of Marxism has been preponderantly influenced by the national sponsorship it received from the Soviet Union. Following the institutionalization of Academic Sociology at the University of Chicago in the 1920's, and most especially after its American center of gravity moved to the Eastern Seaboard, the world development of Academic Sociology has been preponderantly influenced by the United States. The intellectual schism between Marxism and Academic Sociology was not confined to their different sources of support within any country but was paralleled on the level of an international polarity.

The split between Marxism and Academic Sociology has long

induced each to avoid or to excoriate the other in intramural discussions. Yet while there was little open dialogue, there was a limited or subterranean intercourse between them; e.g., Malinowski, Merton, and Bukharin. One might say that in the United States Marxism was part of the suppressed "underculture" of Academic Sociology, particularly for those who matured during the 1930's. Correspondingly, Academic Sociology had a similar position vis-à-vis Marxism in the Soviet Union.

In the latter part of the fourth period, especially following World War II and the demise of Stalinism, the public dialogue between the two traditions grew more open. "Concrete sociology" emerged as an academic discipline in the Soviet Union, while in the United States Marxism increasingly influenced the critique of Parsonsianism—there was the beginning of a more "dialectical" sociology. Both these wings of Western Sociology began to attend the same international conferences of sociologists.

The schism between Marxism and Academic Sociology still remained, however, a major global split during the Parsonsian period. In both the Soviet Union and the United States sociology was used as an instrument of state policy, both with respect to domestic problems and as an instrument for international leverage, influence, and prestige. The Soviet Union had long employed Marxism in this manner; the United States has done this increasingly since the growth of its Welfare State following World War II, and it also has used the social sciences to check the spread of political and intellectual movements friendly toward Marxism and communism. It has sent social scientists to Viet Nam; it has sought to study revolutionary movements in Latin America; it has sponsored the formation of social science organizations in Europe, such as the Italian Social Science Research Council; and it has influenced such international organizations as the OECD.

In consequence of this new American expansionism, the split between Marxism and Academic Sociology has become complicated by the emergence of a somewhat autonomous "Third Force"; that is, by self-conscious effort among some European sociologists to move toward a Pan-European sociology characterized by a rejection of compulsive anti-Marxism and the various American intellectual paradigms. Academic sociologists and Marxists in Europe have manifested an increasing readiness to exchange views: a few random examples are the summer school at Korçula, the *New Left Review*, Lucien Goldmann, Tom Burns.

By the 1960's the polarized structure of Western Sociology had thus become overlaid with, though not superseded by, a polycentricist structure. Polycentrism within Marxism itself was spurred by the drives toward autonomy of East Europeans, by Maoism and

Castroism, as well as by a more scholarly neo-Marxism. Polycentrism was also manifested within Academic Sociology in general and American sociology in particular, on both the institutional and the theoretical levels. On the one side, powerful new centers of study and training sprang up in the United States to challenge the traditional precedence of Chicago and Harvard Universities. On the other, George Homans, Erving Goffman, and Harold Garfinkel formulated theoretical or methodological positions that contrasted sharply and competed with the dominant Parsonsian formulations.

So the new structural characteristic of American Academic Sociology in the late 1960's is the declining centrality of Parsonsianism. We appear to be slowly entering an interregnum, in which the system erected by Parsons—since World War II the dominant theoretical synthesis—is undergoing a quiet eclipse. I shall, in a later chapter, elaborate on why I think this is happening and what it is bringing about. Here, however, I will simply outline the argument briefly and focus primarily on its structural implications.

PARSONSIANISM: IMPENDING ENTROPY

Parsons' system is undergoing a kind of entropy and is taking a declining place in the professional attention of academic sociologists; in consequence, there is no longer a single, organizing, intellectual center for the sociological community. Parsons' system was often a paradigm that gave coherence to the sociological community as much by the controversy it elicited as by the converts it won. Today, however, it is used less as a system than as an encyclopedia: parts of it are used here and there when sociologists remember that it discusses a problem on which they happen to be working; pieces of it are ingested in various areas of specialized work. This is happening, however, not because its opponents crushed it; indeed, in some respects it was never well enough organized to be dealt a crushing blow. It has been not so much exploded as picked apart and now is slowly expiring under the growing apathy of its audience. Parsons' own students grow less distinguishable from those of other schools. In the course of influencing American sociology, Parsons' own system loses its own intellectual distinctiveness and its boundaries become less distinct.

If this leaves a vacuum at the center, we may, however, suspect that it will not long be empty. For, in a way, Academic Sociology is a science of repeatedly new beginnings; which is to say, it has a strange tendency towards amnesia. In my own lifetime I have known three sociologists who have said or publicly announced that

with them, or at least with their students, sociology was at last going to begin. However much one may deplore this lack of perspective, one can admire the dedication implicit in such an ingenuous view.

To call Academic Sociology a science of new beginnings is to suggest that it had best be wary of its faddish proclivities. At the same time, however, it is to call attention to certain of its strengths: its relative openness to intellectual innovations and its readiness to deficit-finance them. To call Academic Sociology a science of new beginnings is to take note of both its sometimes genuine openness to intellectual novelty and its amnesia about its own heritage.

Among the sources of the impending entropy of Parsons' system, I shall only and briefly note two factors here: (1) the development of a distinct culture of the young, and (2) the very rapid growth of the Welfare State following World War II. A new structure of sentiments is emerging among important sectors of the younger generation, in particular among those who are students and thus very close to the academic establishments within which Academic Sociology was developed and is taught. This new structure of sentiments may be summarily characterized as consisting of those elements expressed in the New Left, on the one hand, and in Psychedelic Culture, on the other. Both of these are, as I will later elaborate, deeply dissonant with the sentiments and assumptions embedded in the Parsonsian synthesis. It is not likely that the devotees of Psychedelic Culture will find Parsonsianism congenial; indeed, the mind boggles at the thought of a Parsonsian hippie. Parsonsianism will be felt to be irrelevant by the young adherents of the New Left no less than by the exponents of Psychedelic Culture. But this does not inevitably preclude a "Left Parsonsianism," or a "Neo-Parsonsianism"—in short, a Parsonsianism "stood upon its feet"—any more than the conventional Hegelianism of the early nineteenth century precluded a Left Hegelianism or a Neo-Hegelianism. One cannot preclude the possibility of a radical (as distinct from a Welfare State) Parsonsianism, even if one cannot really believe it.

The relationship of Parsonsianism to the Welfare State is a more complex problem. Modern sociology emerged most fully when the middle class was free of the threat from the past or where it never regarded it as a threat. It is apparent that sociology becomes most fully *institutionalized* under the sponsorship of a powerful middle class that has freed itself of the hegemony of older elites. Still, if an industrial society were totally secure, if it had no social problems that needed to be understood and managed, it would merely appreciate but would not liberally endow a sociology. In almost all of Western Europe, therefore, the emergence of the Welfare State and

of the problems to which it was a response has been the single most important stimulus for the rapid development of Academic Sociology as a social *institution*. It was the burgeoning of the Welfare State after World War II, with its massive financing and its emphasis on a broader *social* utilitarianism, that provided the most favorable context for the institutionalization of sociology; it is, indeed, slowly accomplishing this even in England.

The modern Welfare State and its accelerated support of Academic Sociology are the responses of a modern middle class which is both entrenched and threatened. No longer living under the shadow of Restorationism, it is a middle class that has great influence on the society and state apparatus. At the same time, this middle class is threatened by the development of international communism and by the collapse of its influence abroad. It is threatened also by growing internal crises at home, by the demands of dissident social strata, like the racially subjugated, the students, the welfare dependents. Modern Academic Sociology and the Welfare State are the interlocking responses of a middle class that does not fear the past but does not look forward to a fundamentally different future. They are responses that seek to reply to current tensions within the framework of the existent master institutions of middle-class society. They are the responses of a middle class wealthy enough to pay the costs of the Welfare State, however reluctantly, and which still believes that its own institutions are fundamentally sound. Being sound, they are not felt to need a radical reformation but only a kind of fine-tuning. Social problems are, then, thought to be soluble by modest inputs of centralized administration, along with expert services, research, and advice, and a modest amount of income redistribution. The problems, in short, are seen in terms of technological paradigms and are thought to be soluble in the manner of engineering tasks.

The needs of the new Welfare State, then, constitute both the growth opportunities and the limiting conditions that shape modern Academic Sociology as an institution; Academic Sociology flourishes in a period when Keynesian economics permit effective intervention with respect to the more traditional economic factors. Sociology is thus the $N + 1$ science of the Welfare State, providing it with an expert, university-based staff which addresses itself to the "other," the noneconomic social problems: racial conflict, deviant behavior, delinquency, crime, the social consequence of poverty. The distinctive focus of contemporary sociology—particularly of Functionalism based on social utilitarianism—is on society as a system of interacting variables, and especially upon the manner in which unanticipated social problems are produced by the complex interaction of these variables, particularly the noneconomic ones.

Sociology as the $N + 1$ science is peculiarly well-suited to the requirements of the Welfare State, which is itself the $N + 1$ State, serving as a kind of "holding corporation" for the diverse social problems that recurrently spin off from the normal operation of the society's master institutions.

While the second phase of Parsonsianism is more fully consonant with a Welfare State, there are, as I suggested earlier, other ways in which it is dissonant with it: most specifically, in its conception of the equilibrating process as largely spontaneous in character and as self-perpetuating. Not starting from a situation in which conformity had broken down, Parsonsian analysis never considered the mechanisms that may be mobilized deliberately, by the state and other institutions, to prime the social process when it has failed. The infrastructure of Parsonsianism remains pre-Keynesian, insofar as it conceives of the relations among institutions, or actors on the tacit model of a spontaneously equilibrated *laissez-faire* economy rather than of a state-managed welfare economy. It still remains deeply committed to the importance of the role of moral values as sources of social solidarity and sees these, in liberal perspective, as elements that should not be instrumentally manipulated by the state. Moreover, the Parsonsian model resonates only one conception of the Welfare State, as a gyroscopic engine of social order, but has little relationship with that conception which views the Welfare State as an agency of justice and equality.

Even the second phase of Parsonsianism, then, does not constitute a social theory that fully corresponds with a mature Welfare State. It has become increasingly refracted toward the requirements of the Welfare State, but it remains only a half-born sociology of the Welfare State; on some of its deeper levels it continues to correspond with the requisites of a "free market" society. Parsonsian theory is thus partly out of phase with a mature Welfare State, and it is considerably out of phase with emerging Psychedelic Culture. It is becoming, at least partially, irrelevant to the administrative needs at the society's management level, while, at the same time, it does not congenially resonate the new structure of sentiments emerging among potential recruits in younger groups. No longer instrumentally or expressively appropriate to the time, it withers as an intellectual paradigm, while theories advanced, say, by Erving Goffman, Harold Garfinkel, or George Homans provide a more recent, significantly different reflection of the period.

NOTES

1. Henri de Saint-Simon, *Social Organization, the Science of Man and Other Writings*, F. Markham, ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 9.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 26-77.
3. George Brandes, *Main Currents in Nineteenth Century Literature* (New York: Macmillan, 1901), III, 79, 85.
4. Quoted in F. B. Artz, *Reaction and Revolution, 1814-1832* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1934), p. 49.
5. See *Madame de Staël on Politics, Literature and National Character*, Monroe Berger, ed. and trans. (New York: Doubleday, 1964). This includes a translation of her work on Germany and has an excellent introduction.
6. Werner Sombart, *Der Bourgeois* (Munich: 1913), p. 263.
7. Karl Marx, *Capital*, Eden and Cedar Paul, trans. (New York: Dutton, 1930), II, 670.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*
10. Saint-Simon, *Social Organization, the Science of Man and Other Writings*, p. 4.
11. Perry Anderson, *New Left Review* (July-August 1968), p. 12.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 14-15.
14. J. W. Burrow, *Evolution and Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 226.
15. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 86.
16. B. Malinowski, "Ethnology and Society," *Economica*, II, 208-219.
17. Burrow, *Evolution and Society*, p. 199.
18. Quoted in Anderson, *New Left Review*, p. 48.
19. Irving Zeitlin, *Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory* (N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968).
20. See Barbara S. Heyl, "The Harvard 'Pareto Circle,'" *Journal of the History of Behavioral Sciences*, IV, No. 41 (October 1968), 316-334.
21. Personal letter, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 317.
22. George Homans review of J. Freeman's *An American Testament*, in *Saturday Review of Literature*, XV (October 31, 1936), 6.
23. T. Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory Pure and Applied* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1949), p. 185.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 186.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 185.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 187.
27. "My own inclination," Parsons adds, "is to refer above all to Durkheim (*The Division of Labor in Society*, especially) as the fountainhead of the primary fruitful trend." (*et al.*, I, No. 2 [Winter 1967], 6.)